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ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property Law permits the making of "monopoly" profits by granting 
exclusive rights in respect of innovations. The exclusive rights prevent 
appropriation of the innovation and permit innovators to recover development 
costs, thereby encouraging innovation. Competition law promotes competition in 
markets as a means to ensure economic efficiency. Although competition law and 
intellectual property Law ultimately share the common goal of promoting 
economic efficiency (and hence consumer welfare), the exclusivity of intellectual 
property Law conflicts with competition Law's aim of efficient, competitive, 
markets. This paper suggests that competition Law should not interfere with the 
incentive scheme of intellectual property Law but that the anti-competitive effects 
of intellectual property Law should be Limited to those expressly deemed by 
intellectual property Law to be necessary to encourage innovation. Once the 
existence of the intellectual "property right" itself is accepted, competition law 
should restrain the anti-competitive exercise of these rights in Licensing 
agreements. In particular the paper argues that the intellectual property rights 
holder should be permitted to divide and assign the totality of the statutory grant 
of rights as the rights holder considers best achieves efficient exploitation, and 
that competition Law should only intervene when licensing terms, or refusals to 
License, are aimed at procuring advantages not directly envisaged by the 
intellectual property right. These "collateral" advantages should be subjected to 
the usual competition law tests to determine their validity. The paper argues 
that the Commerce Act 1986 ("the Commerce Act") attempts to observe these 
principles, but that the Commerce Act exemption provisions, which are the 
mechanism for regulating the interface, contain anomalies in their operation and 
are uncertain in their scope. The paper also emphasises that intellectual 
property rights confer a monopoly only in respect of a product, and that market 
power is not created where adequate product substitutes exist. Therefore the 
failure of an intellectual property Licensing term to fall within one of the 
Commerce Act exemptions will not automatically doom the licensing term to 
condemnation. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 15 OOO words. 
Intellectual Property Right Exemptions 
I INTRODUCTION* 
The Commerce Act 1986 ("the Commerce Act") promotes competition in New Zealand 
markets. At first glance the Commerce Act directly conflicts with intellectual property law 
which grants "monopoly" rights. Ultimately however both the Commerce Act and 
intellectual property law seek to promote economic efficiency, and hence consumer 
welfare. Intellectual property law achieves this by granting exclusive rights in respect of 
innovations. This prevents appropriation by competitors and therefore permits the making 
of monopoly profits. By permitting effective commercial exploitation, the socially and 
economically desirable of goal innovation is encouraged. Competition law achieves 
economic efficiency by prohibiting anti-competitive conduct in markets which may lead to 
excessive prices. Firms exposed to competition will be encouraged to become the most 
efficient, and pass efficiency gains on to the consumer. 
Because the legislature deems intellectual property law to be necessary to encourage 
innovation, competition law cannot challenge the existence of intellectual property rights. 
Once the existence of the intellectual property right is accepted however, the exercise of 
that right should be subject to the same competition policy as the exercise of tangible 
property rights. Therefore this paper purports that competition law should not disrupt the 
incentive schemes created by intellectual property statutes, and conversely that intellectual 
property law should not permit anti-competitive conduct beyond that necessary to 
maintain the incentive to create as envisaged by the relevant intellectual property statute. 
Intellectual property licensing contracts have the potential for the inclusion of anti-
competitive terms. While some restrictive licensing terms are legitimate, licensing 
contracts have been used to monopolise secondary markets and to gain advantages 
"collateral" to the intellectual property right. Such contracts are subject to competition law 
•The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance and encouragement of Yvonne van Roy in the 
preparation of this paper. 
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scrutiny. In regulating the interface, one should ask whether the conduct in question a 
necessary incident of the intellectual property regimes. If the conduct is not, and is 
therefore an attempt to accrue anti-competitive advantages beyond those envisaged by the 
intellectual property statute, then competition law should apply. From this test two general 
principles emerge: First, the intellectual property rights holder ("the rights holder") should 
be entitled to divide and license the totality of the grant as the rights holder considers will 
best achieve efficient exploitation, and secondly, that the rights holder is precluded from 
gaining advantages "collateral" to the rights conferred by the intellectual property statute. 
This paper argues that the Commerce Act attempts to observes these principles. 
While no cases have yet dealt with the Commerce Act interface in New Zealand, cases 
considering functional copyright1 and the inbuilt limitations on intellectual property right 
monopolies,2 suggest that (from the perspective of competition economics) the New 
Zealand courts have adopted a stance generally more disposed to protecting intellectual 
property rights holders than have the courts of many overseas jurisdictions. 3 
Hammond observes that "the relationship between intellectual and industrial property 
values and competition policy has been inadequately thought through in New Zealand and 
needs attention" .4 Currently the interface is regulated by two exemptions in the Commerce 
Act. First, section 45 provides an outright exemption from all of the restrictive trade 
practices provisions in Part II of the Commerce Act except for section 36 (which has its 
1See the series of cases beginning with PS Johnson v Bucko Enterprises [ 1975) I NZLR 3 I I discussed in 
the text below at n 39. 
2See Sleiman v News Media (Auckland) Ltd (1994] 2 NZLR 673 (CA) discussed below at n 38. 
3Compare the United States Supreme Court's copyright judgments of the last decade, in Feist Publications 
Inc v Rural Telephone Service Company Inc 113 L Ed 2d 358 and Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music 127 L 
Ed 2d 500 in particular which firmly restrict the scope of the right. In Britain see the House of Lords' 
judgment in British Leyland v Armstrong Patents [ 1986) I All ER 850 discussed below at Part IV C and 
in Appendix B. 
4Professor G Hammond in Law Commission Report No 13 Intellectual Property: The Context for Reform 
(Law Commission, Wellington, 1990), 29. 
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own exemption) and sections 37 & 38 (retail price maintenance)5• The section provides 
that a licensing provision is not subject to the Commerce Act "in so far as it contains a 
provision authorising any act that would otherwise be prohibited" by the statutory 
intellectual property right. Basically the section exempts from the application of the 
Commerce Act "permissive" licensing provisions that assign the whole, or portions, of the 
intellectual property right. Secondly, section 36(2) provides a qualified exemption.6 A 
dominant position in a market is not used for a proscribed purpose under section 36( 1) "by 
reason only that [the rights holder] seeks to enforce" a statutory intellectual property right. 
Several other minor statutory provisions affect the interface. Section 7 of the Commerce 
Act provides an exemption for the common law breach of confidence action, and section 
43 of the Commerce Act provides an exemption for conduct specifically authorised by 
other Acts. Additionally, provisions in the Patents Act 1953 ("the Patents Act") restrict 
some anti-competitive practices. 
It should be noted at the outset that the fact that the Commerce Act applies to specific 
terms in licensing agreements does not necessarily preclude the conduct in question. The 
competition law tests, such as "substantially lessening competition" and "market 
dominance", must first be satisfied before contravention of the Act is established. 
II ECONOMIC RATIONALES 
McCarthy notes that one's view concerning the regulation of the interface will "largely 
turn upon one's own personal set of priorities as to the relative importance of intellectual 
property and antitrust. This in tum, depends upon what one sees as the true goals of both 
5Resale price maintenance is never exempted, but it can be authorised. See below n 179. 
6Section 36A(2) is the Trans-Tasman counterpart and issues particular to section 36(2) are dealt with 
below in Part XV. 
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intellectual property law and antitrust law". 7 With this caveat in mind, the purpose of these 
areas of the law are examined. 
A Economic Rationale for the Commerce Act 1986 
New Zealand competition law is rooted firmly in economic principle and is not 
complicated by the political overtones that exist in the United States, such as the "freedom 
to trade" and a distrust of large aggregations of wealth. 8 Instead, such debate as exists in 
New Zealand is about the focus of competition law is whether economic efficiency is best 
achieved by competition or monopoly.9 The Commerce Act in its current form clearly 
prefers the former approach. The debate has resulted in a shift of focus from consumer 
welfare to economic efficiency however. The author assumes for the purposes of this 
paper that both short and long term efficiency are best achieved by a competitive business 
environment. 10 The Commerce Act is an Act to promote competition in New Zealand 
7J McCarthy "Intellectual Property and Trade Practices Policy: Coexistence or conflict? The American 
Experience" 1985 Australian Business Law Review 198, 199. 
8Hence the Commerce Act does not prohibit monopolisation per se (other than by business acquisitions 
under Part III), but only restrains monopolistic or anti-competitive behaviour. United States antitrust law 
in contrast is underpinned by what McCarthy, above n 7, 207, describes as "Jeffersonian populism" - a 
preference for a business structure of small firms in competition with each other independent of any 
economic reasoning. This principle was articulated by Learned Hand J in US v Alcoa 148 F 2d 416 
(1945). "(Congress] was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone ... Throughout the history of 
these [antitrust] statues it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and 
preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organisation of industry in small units which 
can effectively compete with each other". See R Pitofsky "The Political Content of Antitrust" 127 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1051, 1053 & 1058 for a discussion of the traditional United 
States antitrust concerns of large aggregations of capital as potentially disruptive political forces and the 
concern for the ability of the small businessman to earn a living from trade. 
9See T Hazeldine "The Role of Efficiency in Competition Policy" Fifth Annual Workshop of the 
Competition Law & Policy Institute of New Zealand, Volume I, and J Land "The Role of Efficiency in 
Competition Policy" Fifth Annual Workshop of the Competition Law & Policy Institute of New Zealand, 
Volume 1. 
10An absence of competition can lead to efficiency gains through greater economies of scale and 
procurement of operating synergies. However monopolies occur at the e pense of a competitive business 
framework which ensures long term efficiency. In the absence of competition there is no assurance that 
efficiencies arising from monopolisation will be passed on to the consumer. The Commerce Act achieves a 
competitive environment by regulating conduct rather than business structure however. Except in respect 
of business acquisitions, monopolies are tolerated. Monopolistic behaviour however is prohibited. 
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markets. "It is based on the premise that society's resources are best allocated in a 
competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures maximum efficiency in the use of 
resources". 11 Competition, rather than monopoly, will benefit consumers by ensuring that 
goods are available at a price as close to the marginal cost of production as possible. This 
type of economic efficiency is allocative economic efficiency and can be regarded as 
essentially static. 
B Economic Rationale for Intellectual Property Law 
Allocative efficiency alone is insufficient for promoting consumer welfare. Technological 
advancement also has a role to play, and is achieved primarily by intellectual property 
law. 12 This is the economic efficiency associated with innovation - "dynamic" or 
"innovative" economic efficiency. 13 The economic rationale for intellectual property law is 
one of monetary incentive. By securing exclusive exploitation rights to the inventor, 
innovation is encouraged. 14 The encouragement of innovation and the disclosure of that 
11 Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records [1988] 2 NZLR 352, 358 per Richardson J. See also K Vautier 
"Competition PoHcy and Competition Law in New Zealand" in A Bollard (ed) The Economics of the 
Commerce Act (NZ Institute of Economic Research, Wellington, 1989) Chapter 3, 46, who has mirrored 
these comments stating that the underlying presumption of competition law is that "more rather than less 
competition ... will improve the economy's ability to increase economic and social welfare, in that it will 
necessarily lead to more efficient resource allocations. 'Competition policy' thus represents an explicit 
choice among alternative means of pursuing ultimate economic and social objectives". 
12In some circumstances innovation may prosper in a competitive environment without intellectual 
property protection. Where the assumptions upon which the current intellectual property regime are based 
do not apply, the absence of intellectual property laws and the presence of a competitive environment may 
actually foster innovation. Seen 17 below. 
13This paper uses the term "innovative" economic efficiency rather than "dynamic" economic efficiency 
because the latter term can also be used to describe types of efficiency associated with non-innovation 
products. For example, allocative efficiency can be viewed in static or dynamic senses. Dynamic allocative 
economic efficiency may be used when discussing the incentives for a firm to develop an essential facility 
such as a railroad or telecommunications network. 
14Historically there has been much debate about whether the foundation of intellectual property rights is 
in natural law or public policy. The school that one subscribes to will affect one's interpretation of the 
proper object and scope of intellectual property law. Under the natural law theory intellectual property law 
rewards creators by providing protection for the fruits of their labours. Under the public policy theory the 
social and economic utility of creativity is acknowledged and creators are rewarded with enough fruits of 
their labour to act as an incentive for further creative activity. Currently the public policy basis of 
intellectual property law is dominant: the monetary incentive is a means to an end. The ultimate purpose 
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innovation are the major objects of intellectual property law. An intellectual property right 
is a "monopoly" in the sense that it provides the rights holder with the "power to occupy 
an area of activity with a degree of exclusiveness", 15 but the monopoly is of a product and 
not a market. 16 Only if there are no substitutes for the intellectual property will 
monopolisation of a market be possible. 
The fixed costs in developing intellectual property are great while the marginal cost of 
manufacturing intellectual property goods is competitively small. Once invented, 
intellectual property goods can be duplicated at little effective cost (relative to tangible 
goods), and in theory, intellectual property is easily "appropriated" by competitors. 17 If 
appropriation were permitted most of the benefits would be "external" to the inventor. 
Competitors that did not bear the costs of development will not have these fixed costs to 
recover 18 and could undercut the original producer by selling closer to marginal cost. 
of the laws relating to patent and copyright is to promote consumer welfare: the manufacture of affordable 
consumer goods and the promotion of the community's intellectual well-being. See G Hadfield "The 
Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective" 38 Copyright Law Symposium ( 1992) I , 2. 
15L Melville Forms and Agreements in Intellectual Property and International licensing (Clark 
Boardman Company New York, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd London, 1979 rev ed 1991 ) 1.3. 
16Melville, above n 15, argues that the term is al o misleading because it implies control of existing 
resources rather than control over the fruits of one's own labour. The term "monopoly" has some useful 
purpose in intellectual property law to stress the trade regulation nature of intellectual property law as 
opposed to a competing natural law "property" basis to intellectual property which obscures the limited 
nature of the rights holder's statutory grant. See L R Patterson & S W Lindberg The Nature of Copyright -
A Law of Users' Rights (University of Georgia Press, Athens Georgia, 1991 ). 
17 Any economic model makes assumptions about the framework in which it operates . In the case of 
intellectual property these assumptions may be too broad to allow development of the law from a purely 
theoretical stand-point. Some of the assumptions the model makes are that there are no transfer costs in 
appropriating another's' creativity, that perfect competition exists , that the "first mover" into a market 
gains no advantage, that markets are "contestable" , and that the period of protection is no more than is 
needed to recover the fixed costs. See R Benko Protecting Intellectual Property Rights - Issues and 
Controversies (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research , Washington D.C. 1987) 
generally. However as I Eagles "Intellectual Property and the Commerce Act" Unpublished Paper, 
Department of Accountancy, Auckland University, 5, notes , the interface is not constructively regulated by 
simply attacking the theoretical premises of each area of the law. Therefore this paper assumes that 
intellectual property law is sound in principle and any anomalies in its application are ignored . 
18Economic theory states that where perfect competition exists, price will equal the "marginal cost" of 
production (ie the increase in total cost resulting from a unit increase in output). This would not allow the 
original producer to recoup the cost of development. 
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Without laws conferring monopoly rights to allow recovery of the fixed costs 19 involved in 
creating intellectual property goods, there would be a total "market failure" in promoting 
innovation, and it would effectively cease.20 
Consider the following example: A and B are equal sized companies. A has brought a 
book onto the market and is retailing it at $10. B begins to manufacture and sell the book 
at $9. B will gain a greater market share and earn more profits as, other things being 
equal, rational consumers will purchase the cheaper book. Are A and B competing on an 
even footing? Both will have had to bear the cost of 'tooling up' to print the book, and the 
raw materials and distribution costs will be equal. But what if A paid the author to write 
the book? What if A has marketed the book? B bears neither the fixed cost of 
development nor of advertising. B is able to sell the book closer to the marginal cost that 
A, though neither may be making "super-normal" net profits. A has simply incurred more 
costs. B is a "free rider" . Such a situation is allocatively efficient as the resource is in the 
hands of the party best able to use it - competition brings the price closer to marginal cost. 
This state of affairs would not encourage the creation of further books or technology 
however as it would be impossible to recoup the costs of development. There would be a 
market failure in promoting innovation. 
Therefore intellectual property law grants the innovator exclusive exploitation rights, 
allowing a producer to raise prices above marginal cost. As the market failure to promote 
innovation results from the inability of the original producer to recover the fixed costs, 
19Fixed costs are a factor in any economy of scale whether in tangible or intangible goods. An example of 
a fixed cost in intellectual property is type-setting for a book. The writer also uses the term to include 
R&D costs or authors' fees etc . In theory only some of these fixed costs must be met by competitors (eg 
type setting but not the authors' fees ). 
20However market failure may not occur in all cases where intellectual property protection does not exist. 
Where the innovator gains the "first mover advantage" the foothold in the market place may be strong 
enough to permit recovery of fixed costs. Furthermore not all intellectual property is easily appropriated. 
Aeroplanes and racing yachts are not easily reverse engineered. Reproduction of the subtleties of such 
designs would be impossible without plans. America's Cup contestants continuously attempt to copy each 
others designs, but to no avail even without the intervention of intellectual property laws. See Benko, 
above n 17, generally. 
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intellectual property law protection extends only long enough for the fixed costs to be 
recovered.21 Hence the term of copyright and patent protection is limited. Benko sums up 
the position when discussing patents: 22 
Intellectual property rights ... grant the inventor a temporary monopoly over the use 
of his or her invention and prevent competitors from sharing the knowledge 
without payment. They thus compensate for market failure and thereby solve the 
problem of appropriability... Static economic efficiency or optimal resource 
allocation is violated in the short term in an effort to generate a continuing supply 
of inventions. 
Once it is accepted that innovation is worth protection as a property right, it is unhelpful 
from a competition law perspective to view this as a disruption of allocative efficiency in 
itself. Property rights in tangible goods also "inhibit" allocative efficiency in an analogous 
manner, yet without a legally enforceable property right such goods would not be 
produced either.23 "Competition can only evolve as a regulatory mechanism in an 
economically meaningful manner once the results of productive labour are protected by 
property rights" .24 The focus of competition law should not be to attack the existence of 
the intellectual property right, but to restrain the exercise of intellectual property right in 
licensing agreements that disrupt allocative efficiency beyond the scope of the original 
statutory grant. 
21 The degree of protection necessary to encourage innovation is outside the scope of this paper. It is 
assumed therefore that the present intellectual property law regime is adequate for its purpose. 
22R Benko, above n 17, 17. 
23See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Competition Policy and Intellectual 
Property Rights (OECD, Paris, 1989), 11-14 generally. 
24M Lehman "Property and Intellectual Property - Property Rights as Restrictions on Competition in 
Furtherance of Competition" (1989) 20 ICC I, 12 (emphasis added), quoted in Ministry of Commerce 
1990 Discussion Paper on the Commerce Act, 224. 
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l Non-innovation intellectual property 
Not all intellectual property is subject to an "incentive for innovation" analysis. An 
alternative rationale for the interface may be needed. The law of trade marks grants 
exclusive rights for product packaging rather than in the product itself. Thus trade marks 
law does not act as an incentive to innovate and is unrelated to dynamic economic 
efficiency.25 By regulating product packaging to reduce "search" costs, trade marks law 
permits rational consumers to select superior products. This permits market forces to 
reward efficient producers. Hence trade marks laws are related to allocative economic 
efficiency. No control is granted over the product per se and therefore no question of 
market power arises.26 Trade marks are most relevant to competition law in franchising 
cases. As trade marks are not really relevant to innovation, and as the intellectual property 
link to franchise agreements is at best tenuous, trade mark licensing is not specifically 
addressed in this paper. 21 
C Economics of the Interface 
The disruption of allocative efficiency is disrupted to the extent necessary to encourage 
innovation by the creation of a property right in innovation. The intellectual property right 
provides the economic incentive. Once the results of "productive labour" are protected by 
a property right no further disruption of allocative efficiency should be countenanced. In 
25R Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown and Company, Boston and Toronto, 1986) 37. 
Posner views trade marks partially in terms of incentive however. If the trade mark right was not to 
exclusive use, then producers would have no incentive to create them, and consumers would suffer. The 
point is that trade marks are not desirable innovations in themselves . They primarily operate to identify 
products. Posner notes also that trade marks can bestow monopolies of markets when they become generic 
terms. When this occurs the trade mark will not be renewed. 
26Unless the trademark is the product. This may be the case with "image" goods such as Coca Cola where 
more importance is attached to the logo than the quality of the product on which it appears . 
27Franchising agreements are generally permissible under competition law. Franchising promotes 
business growth and foster interbrand competition. For example Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonalds 
are highly competitive. 
Competition Law (LAWS 525) 
Intellectual Property Right Exemptions 10 
other words, the rights holder is entitled to monopoly profits on the innovation, but 
nothing more. For purposes of analysing the interface, it is assumed that the current 
intellectual property rights are broad enough in scope to provide an adequate incentive for 
innovative activity. If not, defects in the intellectual property statutes (such as the term of 
protection) should not be remedied by allowing anti-competitive practices. Revision of the 
statue conferring the rights would be appropriate. 
III INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
There are subtle but important differences between the various types of intellectual 
property rights which have ramifications upon the Commerce Act interface. The following 
is a brief summary of the most relevant features of the intellectual property law statutes. 
A The Patents Act 1953 
A patent is a monopoly on innovations in either products or in manufacturing processes.2s 
To gain patent protection the Patents Act 1953 ("the Patents Act") requires that the 
interest be registered.29 This involves drafting a "specification" of the innovation which is 
both difficult and expensive.30 If the specification is incomplete the patent can be contested 
and struck down. If the specification is too detailed the patentee may give away more 
trade secrets than necessary to obtain protection. To obtain patent protection the 
innovation must actually be a new one.31 This high threshold justifies the grant of a total 
28W R Cornish Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1981), 132, notes that the "basic distinction [in patent law] is between, on the one 
hand, product or substance claims and, on the other, process, method or use claims. The first of these 
categories comprises claims to things . Such claims are infringed primarily by making, selling or using the 
things claimed. The second category concerns procedures for conducting activities. Here infringement 
consists primarily of performing the activity". The competition law implications of this duality are in the 
extent that the patent monopoly extends into the market place. This is discussed below in Part IV A. 
29Section 7 of the Patents Act 1953. 
30see Cornish, above n 28, 111. 
31 Sections 13 & 14 of the Patents Act. 
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monopoly. No use of the patented innovation is permitted without license even if the 
innovation is independently discovered.32 This creates enormous pressure to keep 
development projects secret to then be the "first to file" for protection. 33 The patent term 
of protection is 16 years but this will be extended to 20 years by the end of 1994 pursuant 
to the TRIPS agreement.34 
B The Copyright Act 1962 
Copyright originally developed to further the intellectual betterment of the community by 
assuring remuneration for authors and creators.35 The Copyright Act 1962 ("the Copyright 
Act") grants a limited monopoly over the work. Copyright focuses on originality as 
distinct from novelty: Any original expression of an idea, however hackneyed, will receive 
copyright protection.36 Copyright aims to prevent wholesale plagiarism or piracy, and 
32The Letters Patent provide that "the patentee shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage from 
time to time accruing by reason of the ... invention during the [patent] term" . No one other than the 
patentee shall " ... during the [patent] term either directly of indirectly make use of or put into practice the 
[patented] invention without the consent, license, or agreement of the patentee .. . " See Form A from the 
Third Schedule to the Patents Act Regulations 1954. 
33Cornish, above n 28, 112. 
34Article 23 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods ("TRIPS"). 
35Copyright policy is illustrated in the Long Title to the first copyright act, the Statute of Anne 1709 
(GB): "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the "copies" of printed books in the Authors 
or Purchasers of such Copies during the Times herein mentioned ... " (emphasis added). The Preamble 
continues "Whereas Printers ... have of late frequently taken the Liberty of printing, reprinting and 
republishing Books without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books .. . for preventing 
such Practice and for the Encouragement of Learned Men to compose and write useful Books, be it 
enacted that ... "; The utility of copyright as a device to facilitate social improvement was also recognised 
by the framers of the U.S . Constitution. Article I , § 8, cl 8 states that "The Congress shall have the power 
... to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" (emphasis added). 
36"Copyright protection is given to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works and not to ideas, and 
therefore it is original skill and labour in execution, and not originality of thought that is required". 
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright ( 11 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London), 48, cited in Martin v 
Polyp/as Manufacturers Ltd [ 1969] NZLR 1046, 1050, and Johnson v Bucko Enterprises [ 1975] 1 NZLR 
311 , 315; See Artifakts Design Group v NP Rigg [1993] 1 NZLR 196, 210 for a discussion of the 
authorities on this point and see s 7( I) of the Copyright Act. 
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therefore an independent creator of the same work will also have an enforceable interest. 37 
This is in contrast to the total monopolies granted by other intellectual property rights 
such as patent law and designs law. The low threshold for copyright protection results in a 
further limitation on the copyright monopoly: The "idea-expression" dichotomy. Only the 
expression of a work, and not the idea embodied in a work, is protected. Ideas are free for 
all to use,38 and if protection for ideas is desired it is properly available under patent law. 
Because of the limited nature of the monopoly the term of protection is long - usually the 
life of the author + 50 years. 
In New Zealand copyright protection can extend to functional goods in addition to the 
traditional classes such as books, music, and films. 39 This protection arose from desires to 
include three dimensional art works within the copyright scheme. It was not possible to 
arbitrarily decide what did or did not qualify as an artistic work however, and 
consequently such mundane items as frisbees,40 plastic kiwi-fruit trays,4 1 and rubber 
lavatory pan connectors42 have been afforded copyright protection. The common element 
in these cases seems to be the restraint of competitors rather than the promotion of the 
useful arts.43 The limited monopoly is rather illusory in the functional copyright context as 
37See University of London Press limited v University Tutorial Press limited [ 1916] 2 Ch. 601 , 608. 
38See Sleiman v News Media (Auckland) Ltd Unrep CP 185/94, 30 April 1994, HC Auckland Registry, 
11 . Sleiman concerned a newspaper competition called "Fantasy Football". The defendants had copied the 
key elements of the format and content of the game, without copying any specific wording. In the High 
Court Blanchard J observed that "[i]t may be thought to be hard on an originator of an idea or system that 
it is incapable of copyright protection, but that is the Jaw as I understand it. The Jaw reflects the 
fundamental value that ideas should, except to the limited extent that patent and design protection Jaw 
may grant a monopoly for a period, be in the public domain , to be used and built on to the advantage of 
the public" (emphasis added) . Blanchard J's decision was however overturned by the Court of Appeal on 
the application of the doctrine to the facts . See Sleiman v News Media (Auckland) Ltd (CA), above n 2. 
39See s7(1) of the Copyright Act and the s2 definition of "artistic work" which includes sculptures and 
models . 
40Wham-O MFG Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1984] I NZLR 641. 
41 Plix Products Ltd v FM Winstone (1984) 3 IP 390. 
42P S Johnson, above n 2. 
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infringement can be shown by proof of access to the original work, and proof of 
substantial sirnilarity.44 Unless evidence is adduced by the defendant supporting 
independent creation (ie a "clean room" environment), liability will follow if the goods are 
substantially similar as proof of access is hardly a problem with commercially marketed 
products. Copyright protection of functional goods is especially damaging as the 'idea-
expression' dichotomy (a major limitation on the copyright monopoly) is easily 
manipulated in functional copyright cases. Not all judges share a low view of functional 
copyright however. In Artifakts Williams J noted that45 
Some observers seem to think that the law relating to copyright in industrial design 
and commercial designs has become the red light district of copyright law with 
pernicious bootleg relief freely being made available. If the legislature is persuaded 
of that viewpoint it is for the legislature to move in and close it down. Until then 
the Courts must continue to decide, on a case by case basis, whether, in terms of 
the existing statue and its judicial exegesis, copyright protection should be given. 
The problem stems from the fact that copyright law requires only a very low threshold of 
originality to gain protection. This is in total contrast to patent law. The comments in 
Artifakts were made in response to Thomas J's observations in Franklin Machinery: 46 
Copyright has now invaded the field of technical design in a manner which has 
been dramatic. The most banal of industrial or technical drawings, which involve 
little more originality than that which accompanies many routine domestic tasks, 
has come to attract an aggressive claim to copyright protection. Frequently, the 
monopoly protection which the statue confers is out of all proportion to the degree 
of originality involved in producing the copyright work. 
43Ironically functional copyright appears to operate to the advantage of foreigners rather than any portion 
of the New Zealand public. New Zealand is primarily a consumer of intellectual property goods and the 
degree of functional copyright protection provides overseas interests with protection not available in their 
home countries. 
44Wham-O, above n 40. 
45Artifakts Design Group, above n 36, 213 . 
46Franklin Machinery Ltd v Albany Farm Centre CP 1081/91 Auckland Registry, 8 November 1991, 17; 
See P Sumpter "Case and Comment - Has Copyright Law Got Out of Hand?" 1992 NZLJ 151 (May) for a 
discussion of this case. 
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Parliament did move in 1985 to limit industrial copyright protection by reducing the term 
of protection to 15 years and by removing some of the remedies.47 However the scope and 
availability of protection, which were the fundamental problems, were not addressed. It is 
now likely that the period of protection will be shortened again to 3 years.48 
The law relating to industrial copyright has two important competition ramifications. First 
in the area of after-markets (spare parts),49 and secondly on parallel importation.50 
C The Designs Act 1953 
Registered designs provides protection for functional goods with aesthetic qualities. A 
total monopoly is granted for 15 years. There is a registration requirement however. 
Industrial copyright protection has rendered the Designs Act almost totally 
redundant. 51 
D The Trade Marks Act 1953 
Unlike the previous intellectual property rights, a trade mark is not a monopoly on a 
product.52 A trade mark is simply a right to label a product in a distinctive way. This 
47In particular the prior availability of conversion damages was seen as oppressive. See R J Sutton 
"Industrial Design: The Copyright Amendment Act 1985" (1987) 12 New Zealand Universities Law 
Review 343 generally for a summary of functional copyright cases and the effects of the 1985 
amendments. 
48See A Brown "Review of Copyright Laws Poses a Threat to the Designers' Friend" National Business 
Review, March 18, 1994, 61. This still does not address the scope of the protection however. 
49See below at Part IV C and at Appendix B. 
SO see n 57 below. 
51 See Sutton, above n 47, 349. Lack of registration requirements and the illusory monopoly limitation of 
copyright law mean there is little practical advantage in securing Designs Act protection. Brown, above n 
48, notes that only about 600 designs are registered each year. 
52See text at Part II B 1 above. 
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prevents unfair competition and allows market forces to encourage efficiency by 
facilitating rational consumer choice. Trade mark law does not operate to encourage 
innovation.53 A trade mark can be renewed indefinitely. 
IV THE LIMITATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT 
MONOPOLIES 
A Exhaustion of Rights and the "First Sale" Doctrine 
It is a fundamental principle of intellectual property law that the licensor's rights are 
limited to the first act of commercial exploitation.54 The principle was first enunciated in 
copyright cases. Early copyright statutes granted the copyright holder the exclusive right 
to "print, publish, and vend" the copyright work.55 The issue soon presented to the courts 
was whether the copyright holder could restrain a purchaser of a book from selling (ie 
"vending") the book second hand. The copyright holders' rights were exhausted with the 
"first sale", although obviously the purchaser could be restrained from duplicating and 
selling copies of the book.56 This problem is resolved in modern copyright legislation by 
redrafting the copyrights holder's exclusive rights. The right to "reproduce" the copyright 
work indicates that copyright aims only to protect the market for the work at the point of 
first sale.57 Some copyright holders still try to evade the doctrine by characterising 
53See Posner, above n 25. 
54See Cornish, above n 28, 23-30 and 199-200, generally . Note that the doctrine is not as strictly observed 
in international trade as in domestic trade. Parallel importing restrictions remain an important exception. 
See n 57 below. 
55Section 1 (a) of the Copyright Act 1909 (US) (emphasis added) . See Patterson & Lindberg, above n 16. 
56The first sale doctrine was actually expressly stated in § 27 of the Copyright Act 1909 (US). 
" ... [N]othing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a 
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained". The principle is also stated in § 109 
of the Copyright Act 1976 (US). 
57Some exceptions to the first sale doctrine still exist in the Copyright Act 1962. For example the parallel 
importing provisions in s 10 permit the copyright holder to restrict the importation of econd hand (and 
"new") copies of copyright works even when legally manufactured overseas. The provisions are designed 
to prevent exclusive territorial licenses being circumvented by the importation of goods. As the copyright 
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purchasers as "licensees". This is common in the "shrink wrap" licensing contracts that 
accompany much computer software, which is protected as a copyright work.58 
The first sale doctrine is also true in patent law.59 Here the distinction between patented 
products and patented processes in important. The licensor of a patented product has no 
patent control over that product after the first sale. For example this would be true of a 
patented lawn mower. The licensor of a patented process, such as the chemical treatment 
of timber, has no control over the timber itself but only over the use of the process. 
Difficulties arise where a patent falls in between the two classes. Arguably where the 
patented goods perform innovative functions, such as a patented film projector, the 
purchaser is really a licensee as they are "using" the patent when they use the machine.60 
In these situations the court will have to decide the appropriate scope of the monopoly. If 
the licensor uses the rights within the patent scope to gain collateral advantages then 
arguably this conduct should be subject to competition law. 
holders rights are exhausted by the first sale, a wholesaler may be able to sell second hand but unused 
goods to an importer. The result of the section's drafting is to catch genuine second hand goods with the 
ludicrous result that, when combined with functional copyright, manufacturers can now restrain the 
import of second hand, used, motor vehicles! See C Hutching "Car Dealer Settles Out of High Court" 
1994, 6 May, National Business Review. An exception is made for the importation of goods for private use 
in sl0(2) however. A further difficulty with the first sale doctrine is the modern practice of book, music, 
and video rental. Currently in New Zealand copyright holders have no control over this practice which 
usurps their marketing rights . Section 109(b)(l)(A) of the Copyright Act 1976 (US) provides "rental 
rights" for copyright holders of recorded musical works and computer programs. The Copyright Bill 1994 
proposes to introduce similar rental rights in New Zealand. 
58See D W Bonser "Preemption of 'Shrink-Wrap' Legislation by the Copyright Act" 37 Copyright Law 
Symposium 128 (1990). 
59In the United States the "misuse of patents" doctrine was the initial justification for preventing control 
beyond the first sale rather than antitrust law. Throughout the twentieth century however the principles of 
the doctrine, and the relevant case law, has been absorbed into antitrust jurisprudence. See the comments 
of Goldberg Jin US v Loew's Inc 9 L Ed 2d 11, 18. Cornish, above n 28, 199, notes that the exhaustion of 
rights principle was rather slower to develop in Britain, and had little restrictive effect on licensor's 
activities until the Treaty of Rome in the 1960s. Indeed Cornish, 25, observes that until this time Britain 
had taken the opposite stance to most jurisdictions on the matter - ie that the patentee could control all 
subsequent uses and sales. 
60See Motion Picture Co v Universal Film Co 243 US 502 (1917) below at n 10 I and Transfield Pty Ltd v 
Arlo International Ltd (l 980) ATPR <JI 40-166 in Appendix A. In both cases patented goods were sold, but 
it was uncertain whether the patentee had control over the use of the goods. 
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B Compulsory Licensing Provisions 
The Patents Act, Designs Act, and the Copyright Act have compulsory licensing 
provisions which operate to mitigate the anti-competitive effects of the exclusive rights. 
The relevant Patents Act provisions are the most comprehensive, and are discussed 
below.61 Section 14 of the Designs Act 1953 provides for compulsory licensing orders for 
a registered design on the grounds that it is not being applied by any industrial process to a 
commercially reasonable extent.62 The Copyright Act has no general compulsory licensing 
provisions, as the copyright monopoly is more limited than that of other intellectual 
property rights. Section 22 of the Copyright Act however provides for a compulsory 
license in respect of musical works. When musical recording devices were invented, 
legislatures feared monopolies on musical recordings.63 The compulsory license permits 
the making of recordings by any party of musical works for a prescribed royalty fee, if the 
musical work in question has already been recorded and exploited with the musical work 
copyright holder's permission. 
C The "Spare Parts" Exemption 
The "spare parts exemption" originates from British Leyland v Armstrong Patents64 which 
held that, although copyright subsisted in the component parts of machinery such as 
exhaust pipes, the copyright was not infringed by the commercial manufacture of spare 
parts as the seller of the intellectual property product could not derogate from the "grant" 
61 See text below at Part IX. 
62The rationale for these compulsory licensing provisions is more the public policy goal of promoting 
access to innovation rather than preventing anti-competitive practices although the provisions may also 
perform this latter role. See text below at Part IX. 
63The proviso to§ I (e) of the Copyright Act 1909 (US) was the first compulsory license for musical works 
to be enacted. Similar licenses followed in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. 
64British Leyland, above n 3. 
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by denying the purchaser the right to repair the product.65 The exemption seeks to 
mitigate the excesses of market power that can be created by functional copyright by 
restricting the scope of copyright law. In contrast to an order for compulsory licensing, the 
spare parts exemption does not allow the copyright holder to participate in any of the 
gains resulting from the manufacture of the spare parts. For this reason the House of 
Lords' precedent has not been followed in New Zealand.66 This paper suggests that 
compulsory licensing is preferable to limiting the scope of intellectual property law (as 
enacted by Parliament) as then the copyright holder can gain remuneration from the 
licensing of the intellectual property right, as envisaged by statute, but the copyright 
holder cannot monopolise the market of manufacture and gain monopoly profits from this 
secondary market. 
V INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 
Licensing agreements occur between firms in different functional markets67 and are a 
practical necessity for commercial exploitation. The licensor gains access to markets 
otherwise out of reach and the licensee gains access to proven technology. The licensor 
retains ownership of the rights while allowing another to exercise them. A license will 
contain restrictions on the use of the intellectual property right and may therefore appear 
to be anti-competitive when in fact the license is permissive. The restrictions cannot fall 
65The spare parts exception and the relevant case law is discussed in Appendix B. The doctrine can al so 
be applied to other areas of intellectual property such as computer software. See J Gyngell "A User's Right 
to Repair and Maintain Software?" (1991) 2 Intellectual Property Journal 40 and J Yates "Third Party 
Computer Maintenance - A Legal Perspective" (1994) 10 Computer Law & Practice 9. 
66See Mono Pumps (New Zealand) Ltd v Karinya Industries Ltd 7 IPR 25 and Dennison Manufacturing 
Co & Another v Alfred Holt Co Ltd & Others Unrep. Hight Court, Auckland Registry, 5 March 1987, A 
736/78, Smellie J, discussed in Appendix B. 
67Functional markets are the different vertical levels of a market for a particular product. In an intellectual 
property context, different functional markets might be the markets for development of the innovation, 
manufacture of the innovation product, and distribution of the innovation product. 
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foul of competition law unless the licensing terms go beyond the scope of the original 
intellectual property right to accrue collateral advantages. 
A Benefits of Intellectual Property Licensing 
The primary advantage of licensing is that it permits the maximum exploitation of the 
innovation. The rights holder alone will not be able to obtain the gains from every avenue 
of exploitation. The rights holder may not be vertically integrated68 or the rights holder 
may not be a participant in the relevant geographic or product markets.69 Through 
licensing, a rights holder is able to identify and separate customers "according to the value 
they place on the innovation" and charge accordingly.70 The licensor can create incentives 
for the licensees to use their best endeavours in promoting the innovation, 71 and the 
licensor can structure licenses to encourage the licensee to improve upon the licensed 
innovation.72 Licensing also spreads the economic risk by involving additional 
entrepreneurs with specialised expertise in their respective fields. 73 
68A vertically integrated firm is one that competes in more than one functional market. For example a 
firm that engages in research and development as well as the manufacture of the intellectual property 
goods is vertically integrated. 
69For example, an American firm may not be able to adequately exploit the New Zealand market, 
especially if freight costs are high . Such a form may license a New Zealand firm to manufacture the 
product. 
70In this way the licensor captures the full consumer surplus of each consumer. See OECD, above n 23 , 
19. 
71 The licensor can grant exclusive territorial licenses that prevent "free riding" by competing licensees 
thus encouraging the exclusive licensee to actively promote the product. See text at Part XII A. 
72By granting an exclusive license for particular applications of the innovation the licensee is assured of 
reaping the rewards from any improvements made in that application. See OECD, above n 23, 20. 
730ECD, above n 23, 21 . Simply put, innovations, or particular applications of innovations, can be 
licensed to those best able to exploit them. 
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B Dangers of Intellectual Property Licensing to Competition Policy 
While "[l]icensing is to intellectual property what leases are to real property" ,74 intellectual 
property licensing nonetheless poses risks to competition policy. 
1 Collateral advantages 
Intellectual property rights can be used to gain collateral advantages by exacting monopoly 
profits from markets not properly the subject of the right. Even if no collateral advantages 
are gained in the short term by exacting additional monopoly profits, intellectual property 
rights can be used to leverage market power in different functional, or different product, 
markets.75 Other things being equal the acquisition of market power has a detrimental 
effect on efficiency and consumer welfare as it permits discretionary conduct in markets. 
The means of gaining collateral advantages and gaining power in secondary markets are 
discussed below. 76 
2 Horizantal Arrangements 
"The single greatest concern facing competition authorities when reviewing intellectual 
property licensing agreements is that the agreement is a vehicle for a cartel arrangement to 
fix prices, limit output or divide markets. Although this concern can be briefly stated, it is 
the most serious threat to competition found in such licensing agreements". 77 The extent 
to which the Commerce Act addresses these concerns is discussed in Part_. 
74Eagles, above n 17, I 0. 
750ECD, above n 23, 17 and 25. See text below at Parts XII B and XIII D 2. 
76See text at Part XII B. 
770ECD, above n 23, 23 . 
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C Typical Licensing Provisions in Vertical Arrangements 
The following are some of the most common licensing terms in vertical arrangements.78 
Further licensing terms, including horizontal arrangements, are discussed in the specific 
context of the statutory exemptions later in the paper.79 
1 Exclusive licensing 
Intellectual property rights are inherently exclusive. This exclusivity can be passed on in 
whole or in part to licensees. Many licenses are of limited value unless they are granted 
exclusively. Substantial sunk costs in promoting intellectual property goods and the 
potential for free-riding by competitors may deter potential licensees if exclusivity is not 
granted.80 A film promoter will expect an exclusive license for the film before making any 
investment. The licensee has a vested interest in licensing to an efficient manufacturer. If 
manufacturing costs are kept down, then greater quantities of the goods will be sold, 
increasing the licensor's royalties. Exclusivity is not necessary for all intellectual property 
however. The patent holder for a new means of house construction may seek to license as 
many parties as possible. The fundamental point is that exclusivity is part of the intellectual 
property right grant and the licensor should be free to pass it on if this is the most effective 
means of exploitation. 
78See Table 4-4 from F J Contractor International Technology Licensing: Compensation, Costs and 
Negotiation (1981) in OECD Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights (OECD, 1987) 13, 
reproduced in Appendix C. Some of the licensing provisions discussed in this paper in Parts _ , notably 
tying and price control, do not appear with high frequency in this table of United States Licensing 
provisions. This may be due to inaccurate survey results , or more probably, that effective competition law 
has discouraged these practices. This is supported by the fact that the least frequent licensing provisions 
seem to have been the most litigated! Also see OECD International Technology Licensing: Survey Results 
(OECD, 1987) Table 40 which confirms the findings of Contractor. 
79See text below at Part VIL 
8°This is the ex ante affect of exclusivity which is frequently ignored in both intellectual property 
licensing and in non-intellectual property supply. While ex post it may appear that the lack of competition 
is allocatively inefficient, this must be balanced against the fact that without the exclu ivity the market 
may not exist at all. See below at Part XII A. 
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2 Divisions of the totality of rights 
Licensors will usually impose restrictions on the scope of the licensee's activities. "Field of 
use" restrictions are common licensing terms. 81 An intellectual property right may have 
more than one application. A patented chemical could have medicinal and industrial uses, 
and a film can be used in the cinema or on television. A licensee operating in only one of 
these fields has no desire for rights to operate in the other field. The licensee pays only for 
as much of the "field" as is necessary and the licensor can maximise exploitation 
opportunities. Some manipulation of field of use restrictions is possible however to gain 
collateral advantages and should be subject to competition law.82 
Division of the totality of an intellectual property right is clearly evident in territorial 
exclusivity provisions. A licensee will be granted exclusivity for a particular jurisdiction, or 
sometimes, for territories of smaller area. This is for practical reasons of exploitation. Few 
will be able to exploit an intellectual property right world-wide and many products do not 
lend themselves to this sort of exploitation. It may be easier to manufacture products in 
the destination country rather than ship them. 
Temporal restrictions are also typical. The period of protection afforded by intellectual 
property varies according to the right. Patent protection for pharmaceuticals is 16 years, 
of which only the latter few are practically available for exploitation.83 Thus a license for 
drug manufacture will typically be for the full duration of patent protection. 84 Copyright 
81 In copyright field of use restrictions are the rule rather than the exception. This is partly due to the fact 
that the exclusive rights of a copyright holder are defined in terms of various uses . Section 7(3) of the 
Copyright Act 1962 grants the copyright holder in a literary, dramatic or musical work the rights to 
publish, reproduce, perform, broadcast, transmit on a diffusion service, and make adaptations of the work. 
82A field of use provision can facilitate collateral advantages by defining the field of use so that in practice 
it amounts to a product tie or restriction on composite products . See text below at Part VII C 2. 
83See D Tuffery "Longer Drugs Patents an Urgent Priority" National Bu ine Review, March 18, 1994. 
84Clause 4 of the GA TT (Uruguay Round) Bill 1994 will amend s30(3) of the Patents Act by lengthening 
the period of patent protection to 20 years. 
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works receive much longer protection, usually the lifetime of the author plus 50 years. 
Copyright licenses will therefore commonly be restricted in time. 
Field of use, territorial, and temporal restrictions are not restrictive in themselves. The 
licensee is permitted to do something that would otherwise have been prohibited without a 
license. The licensor is merely dividing and assigning the totality of the intellectual 
property right. No restriction of competition is created beyond that initially granted by the 
intellectual property statute. Each field license or territory license will be an exclusive 
license for that application, but likewise the exclusivity goes no further than the exclusivity 
created by the intellectual property right itself. 
3 Tying 
The term "tying" is used to describe the situation where the licensor of an intellectual 
property product (the "principal" product)85 requires the licensee to pay for additional 
products. The additional products are referred to as the "tied" products. Although a tying 
arrangement can force the purchaser to buy unwanted additional products, the term 
"tying" is usually applied where the licensee already requires additional products and the 
licensee is merely instructed to purchase them from a nominated supplier. The economic 
effect of tying agreements is to inhibit competition in the market for the tied product. 
86 
Where the licensee accepts the tie voluntarily, and declines to deal with competing 
suppliers of the tied product, then it may be assumed that the tied product is being 
supplied on competitive terms. More often however the licensee uses market power in the 
market for the principal product as leverage to impose product ties upon the licensor. 
85These products are sometimes referred to as the "tying" products. 
86See the discussion of Jefferson Parish Hospital District (No 2) v Hyde I 04 S Ct 1551, 80 L Ed 2d 2, 466 
US 2 (1984) below at n 105. 
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Although ties may only be imposed when the supplier has sufficient market power in the 
market for the principal products, such market power may often be present with 
intellectual property. 87 A typical tying arrangement might be where the licensor of a 
patented process for making bricks ties into the license the raw materials for brick 
manufacture. For a copyright example, the licensor of cinema films might tie pop-corn 
supplies to the licensee. 
( a) Full-line forcing and third-line forcing 
Full-line forcing is where the licensor forces additional products of its own upon licensees. 
The licensee may have to purchase the licensor's entire "product range". Third-line forcing 
is where the licensor imposes tied products from a third party supplier. The third party 
supplier can then compensate the licensor. 88 
(b) Intellectual property ties and non-intellectual property ties 
Tied products tend to be non-intellectual property goods such as raw materials. This can 
occur where the licensor has diverse business interests, is itself vertically integrated, or 
where the licensor third-line forces as mentioned above. Alternatively the tied product can 
also be an intellectual property right. This latter situation is described as "package 
licensing". A copyright holder for a film may tie other films to the license, 89 or a patent 
holder may tie other patent processes to the license. The United States courts do not 
discriminate between non-intellectual property and intellectual property goods. In New 
87See text below at Part XIII A. 
88See R I McEwin "Third-Line Forcing in Australia" (I 994) 22 Australian Business Law Review l 14, 
117. 
89 As in US v Loew's, above n 59, discussed below at Part VII D 3. 
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Zealand however the distinction may be material owing to the particular phrasing of 
section 45 of the Commerce Act. This is discussed below. 
4 Exclusive dealing 
Exclusive dealing arrangements are where a licensee is prohibited from purchasing 
products from suppliers other than the licensor. Thus it is the reciprocal of an exclusive 
license which fetters the licensor's freedom to trade.90 Exclusive dealing arrangements are 
different from tying as the former arrangements cannot force the licensee to acquire 
additional products. In practice the distinction may be slight, as where the licensee already 
requires additional products, an exclusive dealing agreement may amount to a 
"constructive" product tie. The effects of an exclusive dealing agreement go beyond tying 
effects however. The licensee is also precluded from purchasing the same products from 
another supplier.91 In an exclusive dealing arrangement the licensee of cinema films could 
not obtain films from other suppliers. In a tying arrangement the licensee must take 
additional films or other products from the licensor, but is still able to obtain films from 
other sources. Hence an exclusive dealing arrangement will protect the licensor's market 
for the principal goods while a tying arrangement will protect the licensor's market for the 
tied goods. 
Exclusive dealing arrangements often occur as reciprocal arrangements for licensee 
exclusivity. If an exclusive licensee were permitted to deal in competing products then 
there may be little incentive for the licensee to promote the licensor's goods, and the 
licensor may be deprived of royalties. Aggressive licensees may use their product 
exclusivity as a means of removing competition from a market. In Transfield v Arla 
9°'fhis is an over-simplification. See HP Marvel "Exclusive Dealing" 25 Journal of Law & Economics 1 
(1982), 4, who notes that exclusive licenses are often used by manufacturers in the absence of exclusive 
dealing arrangements . 
91 Although if the licensor's entire range is full-line forced it may be commercially impractical to deal with 
other licensors. 
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Transfield was the exclusive licensee of the patented "Arlo pole" used in the construction 
of power transmission lines.92 Transfield developed a competing design and ceased to 
market the Arlo pole in substantial quantities. As Transfield had an exclusive license, Arla 
could not license another party to use the pole. Transfield had no incentive to use the Arlo 
pole as its own pole was royalty free and it could block competition from the Arlo pole. 
Exclusive dealing arrangements are frequently aimed at preventing this type of situation 
and therefore are usually limited to products that compete with the licensed product rather 
than all products the licensee may potentially desire to acquire. 93 
5 Refusals to license 
Normally the licensor will grant exclusive licenses and hence not grant licenses to other 
parties. In some circumstances refusals to license may go beyond the rights conferred by 
the intellectual property law and potentially infringe competition law. Where the 
intellectual property right is freely licensed to all applicants, a refusal to license to one 
particular applicant may be an abuse of market power, especially when no substitutes are 
available.94 Furthermore, when an exclusive intellectual property license has been granted, 
the arrangement may also be intended to procure collateral advantages. A licensor with 
market dominance may refuse to license to a third party in order to protect an inefficient 
subsidiary manufacturer. The lack of product substitutes on the market may mean that 
inefficient production does not materially affect product demand. Refusals to license are 
discussed in detail below. 
92Transfield, above n 60. 
93This can be achieved by "best endeavour" clau es. The licensee must use its best endeavours to promote 
the licensed product, but the licensee's other business activities remain unaffected. 
94This might be the case with copyright collection agencies. See the discu sion at Part XIII D 3 of the text. 
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VI REGULATION OF THE INTERFACE 
A New Zealand 
The Commerce Act regulates the interface by a series of exemptions designed to prevent 
the gaining of collateral advantages. Collateral advantages may be obtained in two ways. 
First, onerous licensing terms may be imposed on a licensee. Second, the licensor may 
refuse to license. These issues are dealt with by sections 45 and 36(2) respectively. If a 
licensing provision falls outside of the exemptions, it will not be void ipso facto. The 
elements of the appropriate restrictive trade practices sections in the Commerce Act must 
first be satisfied: An intellectual property right may not confer enough market power for 
section 36 to be applicable, a collateral advantage may not substantially lessen competition 
in a market under section 27, or the licensor may not be vertically integrated as is 
necessary to fall within section 29.95 
The Commerce Act exemptions apply only to statutory intellectual property rights. These 
include copyright, patent, registered designs, trade marks, and registered plant varieties.96 
Not included in the exemption are the "common law" intellectual property rights created 
by actions such as breach of confidence and passing off.97 
95Section 29 requires that an arrangement must be entered into between two or more competitors for the 
purpose of restricting the access to goods or services to or from a third party that is in competition with 
one of the parties to the exclusionary contract. Where the exclusionary contract is between two firms in 
different functional markets prima facie the section cannot apply. If however one of the parties to the 
contract is vertically integrated, so that it is in competition with the subject of the restriction, then the 
elements of section 29 can be satisfied. (See Tui Foods Ltd v New Zealand Milk Corporation Ltd (1992) 4 
NZBLC 103,335). In an intellectual property context section 29 would require that either the licensee was 
competing in the market for innovation or that the licensor was competing in the market for manufacture 
for the section to be breached. 
96The Plant Variety Rights Act 1987 is not dealt with in this paper as it is a somewhat Jess common 
intellectual property right than copyright and patent. 
97See D Calhoun & B Brown The Interface Between Amended Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 and 
Intellectual Property law (Competition Law and Policy Institute of New Zealand (Inc) , August 1990 
Workshop), 17-22, and Eagles, above n 17, 39-43. 
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B Australia 
The Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the Trade Practices Act") also regulates the 
interface with intellectual property exemptions which are found in section 51 (3). There are 
three material differences between the Australian and New Zealand exemptions. First, the 
Australian exemption uses a "relates to" test. Licensing conditions that would otherwise 
have contravened the Trade Practices Act shall not contravene the Act "to the extent that 
the condition relates to" the protected innovation.98 In theory this test applies the collateral 
advantage principle, although it creates some leeway for courts determining what 
"collateral advantages" actually are.99 This test was abandoned from section 45 of the New 
Zealand Commerce Act in 1990. Secondly, section 51(3) does not apply to sections 46 
and 46A that deal with the use of market power - the equivalent of sections 36 and 36A in 
the Commerce Act. Unlike New Zealand no additional exemption is made for section 46 
and 46A. Thirdly, section 51 (1 )( a) of the Trade Practices Act, which is the general 
exemption for acts specifically authorised by other statutes, expressly excludes intellectual 
property rights from its ambit. Section 43 of the Commerce Act contains no such 
exclusion. The significance of these differences is discussed below. 
C The United States 
United States litigation of the intellectual property interface with antitrust law has centred 
around tying agreements, 100 exclusive dealing agreements, 101 and exclusive territory 
98Section 51(3)(a) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) . 
99See below n 134 .. 
100us v Loew's Inc, above n 59, where the licensing of films was conditional on the licensing of further, 
less desirable, films. The Supreme Court held that the contract violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
101 Motion Picture Co, above n 60, where the license of patented film projecting machinery containing a 
prohibition on using the machinery for projecting films from suppliers other than the licensor was held to 
be a misuse of the patent grant (Holmes J dissenting); IBM Corp v US 298 US 13 I ( 1936) where the 
contract use of patented machinery requiring the purchase of stationary from the licensor was held illegal; 
International Salt Co v US 322 US 392 (1947) where the license of patented salt processing machinery 
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agreements. 102 Although the United States regulation of the interface involves no statutory 
exemptions, and the cases have been decided by much the same criteria as non-intellectual 
property anti-trust cases, the courts have observed the collateral advantage principle. In 
Motion Picture Co v Universal Film Co the patent holder for film projecting machinery 
sought to restrain "licensees" from using films other than those of the licensor. 103 The 
court considered the scope of intellectual property right monopolies: 104 
The scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims in it, 
read in light of the specification. These so mark where the progress claimed by the 
patent begins and where it ends ... The restrictions of the [patent] law relate to the 
useful and novel features of the machine which are described in the claims of the 
patent, [and] they have nothing to do with the materials used in the operation of the 
machine... Whatever right the owner may have to control by restriction the 
materials to be used in operating the machine must be derived through the general 
law from the ownership of the property in the machine and it cannot be derived 
from or protected by the patent law, which allows a grant only of the right to an 
exclusive use of the new and useful discovery which has been made - this and 
nothing more. 
Until the late 1970s many licensing practices such as tying were regarded as per se illegal -
anti-competitive effect will be presumed without inquiry into market damage. Under the 
influence of the Chicago school of economics the courts have relaxed this approach. 
Jefferson Parish Hospital v Hyde, although not directly concerning intellectual property, 
is illustrative. 105 Jefferson Parish Hospital had a 30% share of the relevant geographic 
containing a prohibition on purchasing salt from suppliers other than the licensor was held illegal per se 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act; Siegal v Chicken Delight Inc 448 F 2d 43 (197 I) where a contract 
requiring franchisees to purchase raw materials and equipment from the franchisor was held to be subject 
to a per se standard under the Sherman Act; Kypta v McDonald's Corp 671 F 2d 1282 (1982) where the 
license of the franchisor's name was "tied" to the lease of the franchisor's properties but held not illegal 
because the plaintiff suffered no economic damage. 
102Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania 433 US 36 (1977) where a contract restricting a franchisee to 
selling from a particular location was held to be subject to the rule of reason standard. 
103Motion Picture Co, above n 60. 
104Motion Picture Co, above n 60, 510-513. 
105Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86. 
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market. The hospital had engaged the services of Roux, a firm of anesthesiologists, for all 
the hospital's operations. The Roux anesthesiologists in return would work for no other 
hospitals. The effect of this agreement was that patients of the hospital could only use the 
anaesthesia services of Roux. 106 The Supreme Court was unanimous in deciding that this 
arrangement did not breach section 1 of the Sherman Act, 107 but the Court was divided 5 
to 4 on the reasoning. The majority of the Supreme Court took a traditional approach 
concluding that tying breached the Sherman Act per se if the defendant had "monopoly" 
power in the principal product market and used this to force the tied product upon the 
consumer. 108 Citing International Salt Co v US 109 Stevens J noted: 110 
It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the 
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling 
competition and therefore are unreasonable "per se". 
The per se approach was justified by the reasoning that if the tied product could stand in 
the market on its own merits then there would be no reason for the firm with market 
power in the principal product market to use this power to force the tied product upon the 
consumer. 111 In this case however Jefferson Parish Hospital did not have sufficient market 
power to justify the per se condemnation of the tie. 112 
106This agreement was referred to in the case as a tying arrangement. Note however that the tied product 
was not forced upon the patients who did not need it. It may have been more appropriate to describe the 
contract as an exclusive dealing arrangement. The Court did not make this distinction . See Jefferson 
Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1558. 
107Section 1 of the Sherman Act is roughly the equivalent of s27 of the Commerce Act. Section l of the 
Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal...". 
108Implicit in the majority judgment are concerns about the "freedom to trade" and presence of monopoly 
power. See R Pitofsky, below n 8, for a discussion of these considerations in United States antitrust law. 
I09Jnternational Salt Co v US 332 US 392, 396. 
110Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1556. 
111 Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1558, per Stevens J citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co v US 
345 us 594, 605 . 
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The minority held that ties should be subjected to a "rule of reason" test permitting 
evaluation of the tie's effects on competition in the relevant markets. Citing Continental 
TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc 113 O'Conner J noted that the rationale for per se offences: 114 
In deciding whether an economic restraint should be declared illegal per se, "[the] 
probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the 
severity of those consequences [is] balanced against its procompetitive 
consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule 
reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to 
justify the time an expense necessary to identify them" ... 
O'Conner J observed that "in practice, a tie has been illegal only if the seller is shown to 
have 'sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain 
free competition in the market for the tied product"' 115 and then continued: 116 
The "per se" doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an elaborate inquiry 
into the economic effects of the tying arrangement. As a result, tying incurs the 
costs of a rule-of-reason approach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls 
for the extensive and time consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule 
of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic 
analysis would show to be beneficial. 
O'Conner J suggested that tying should be "brought into accord with the law applicable to 
all other allegedly anticompetitive economic arrangements, except those few horizontal or 
quasi horizontal restraints that can be said to have no economic justification 
whatsoever" .117 The rule of reason approach was justified because a firm with enough 
112Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1565. 
113Continental TV Inc, above n 102, 50 n 16 ( 1977). 
114Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1568. 
115Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1569, citing Northern Pacific Railroad Co v US 356 US I, 6 
(1957). 
116 Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1569- I 570. 
117 Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1570. 
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market power in the principal product market to impose a tying arrangement has no 
rational anti-competitive motive for doing so unless it can inhibit competition in the tied 
product market and thus increase its power in that market also. Without a lessening of 
competition in the tied product market, the firm would gain no anti-competitive advantage 
from the tie as the firm's market power in the principal product market would be sufficient 
to gain monopoly profits. 11 8 
This is the approach that would be taken by New Zealand courts, as the majority approach 
in Jefferson of making tying illegal per se where the supplying firm has market power in 
the principal product market cannot fit within the Commerce Act framework. For section 
27 to be breached a substantial lessening of competition in the tied product market is 
necessary, and for section 36 to be breached a dominant position in the principal product 
market would have to be used to hinder, or eliminate, effective competition in the tied 
product market. The only per se offence in the Commerce Act that may be applicable is 
section 29 which would require that the supplying firm, or another party to the 
arrangement, be a competitor of the supplied finn. 119 This generally requires vertical 
integration in the supplying firm which may not be present. 
While most vertical restraints in the United States can now be said to be subject to a rule 
of reason analysis, 120 this position is still far removed from granting absolute intellectual 
118Therefore O'Conner J proposed 3 threshold prerequisites for illegal ties . First the seller must have 
power in the principal product market. Secondly, there must "a substantial threat that the [supplier] will 
acquire market power in the tied-product market". Thirdly, there must be "a coherent economic basis for 
treating the [principal] and ties products as distinct". This last element can only be satisfied when the tied 
product is one that consumers might wish to purchase separately without also purchasing the principal 
product because "[w]hen the tied product has no use other than in conjunction with the [principal] 
product, a seller of the [principal] product can acquire no additional market power by selling two products 
together". When these elements are satisfied then a rule of reason analysis must be conducted to determine 
the tie's effects on competition. See Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1571-1573. 
119See above n 95 and text at Part VII . 
120See Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1570, and V S Khanna "Vertical Restraints: - The Pandora's 
Box of Competition Law" LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Competition Law, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1992, 22 for a discussion of Continental TV v GTE Sylvania , above n 102. 
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property exemptions from antitrust law as the Commerce Act does. The minorities' 
position in Jefferson Parish Hospital is basically the same as the Commerce Act without 
the exemption sections. 121 
VII SECTION 45 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
Section 45 is intended to regulate vertical restraints found in licensing agreements. 122 
Section 45 provides that nothing in Part II of the Act, except the sections relating to use 
of a dominant position and retail price maintenance, applies: 123 
(a) To the entering into of a contract or arrangement or arriving at an understanding in so 
far as it contains a provision authorising any act that would otherwise be prohibited by 
reason of the existence of a statutory intellectual property right; or 
(b) To any act done to give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection. 
The key issue under section 45 as it stands is whether a licensing provision goes beyond 
merely authorising what would otherwise be prohibited by virtue of the intellectual 
property right. This is a "but for" test, 124 and suggests that the licensor may divide the 
totality of the rights in any way desired, but may go no further. The licensing provision 
should be interpreted in light of the original intellectual property right, and any provisions 
seeking to gain advantages collateral to that right will not fall within the exemption. 
121 See text above at Part VI A. 
122Section 36(2) regulates licensing agreement that potentially breach section 36. However claims against 
anti-competitive licensing terms are likely to be first brought under section 27 or section 29 as these 
sections have lower thresholds than the market dominance required by section 36. Section 36 is useful 
when section 45 provides an exemption. Refusals to license, and refusals to license to more than one 
licensee, are examples of practices that could only be challenged under section 36. 
123Section 45(2) defines "statutory intellectual property right" as any rights conferred by the Patents Act 
1953, the Designs Act 1953, The Trade Marks Act 1953, the Copyright Act 1962, or the Plant Variety 
Rights Act 1987. 
124The test asks "but for the license provision would the actions permitted under the license violate an 
intellectual property right?" If so, then the provision is valid. 
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Another way the drafters could have framed section 45 would be to ask whether the 
statute authorises the conduct in question. However most intellectual property rights are 
defined in negative terms (ie what the holder can prevent others from doing) and hence the 
"negative" wording of the section. 125 In substance however section 45 is consistent with 
the Act's general approach of subjecting all conduct to scrutiny that is not specifically 
authorised by another act, although in fact this "form" is not used. 126 
Licensing terms that do not fall within section 45 will be subject to sections 27 and 29 of 
the Commerce Act. 127 Section 27 can apply to vertical or horizontal practices and 
provides that contracts, arrangements, or understandings that have the purpose or effect 
"of substantially lessening competition in a market" are prohibited. Hence an inquiry into 
market damage is necessary before the section can be breached. Many intellectual property 
licensing terms that do not fall within the section 45 exemption may nonetheless be exempt 
because competition in the relevant market is not substantially lessened. Note that 
"substantially lessening competition" test considers effects only on allocative efficiency and 
not innovative efficiency. Section 29 is intended to apply to horizontal arrangements and is 
breached by contracts, arrangements, or understandings in which two or more competitors 
prevent or restrict the supply of goods and services to, or the acquisition of goods or 
services from, any person that is in competition with one of the parties to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding. Section 29 is a per se offence in so far as no inquiry into 
the effects on competition is required if the conduct in question satisfie the elements of 
the section. 128 While section 29 is intended to apply only to horizontal practices, it can 
also apply to vertical practices if an element of vertical integration is present. Vertical 
125Ministry of Commerce, above n 24, 225. 
126Section 43 is the clearest statement of this objective in the Commerce Act. See Ministry of Commerce, 
above n 24, 226. 
127Section 45 also provides an exemption for s28 that concerns covenants that substantially les en 
competition, but as this section is rarely used the discussion is confined to s27 and s29. 
128Prior authorisation may be obtained however. See below n 179. 
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integration occurs where a firm competes in more than one functional market. In an 
intellectual property context this may be where a firm both develops intellectual property 
and manufactures the intellectual property. Where either the licensor or the licensee is 
vertically integrated these parties are technically in competition with each other, and hence 
section 29 can apply. An example would be where a licensor also manufactures the 
intellectual property product. The licensee could be in competition with the licensor in the 
market for manufacture. 129 It should be noted also that prior authorisation is possible for 
practices that might otherwise breach sections 27 and 29 
A Legislative History 
Section 45 was amended to its current form in 1990. Eagles has described the original 
draft of section 45 as a clause of "breathtaking scope", 130 and even in its original enacted 
form it was still an "unforgivably defective instrument to place in the hands of the Courts 
and the Commerce Commission as they seek to evolve a set of principles which will 
preserve the social utility of intellectual property... while immunising consumers and 
traders against their anti-competitive effects" .131 
Before its amendment in 1990, section 45 (1) provided an exemption for contractual 
provisions "relating to the use, licence, or assignment of rights under or existing by virtue 
of' a statutory intellectual property right. Section 45(2) deemed that provisions for the 
purpose of controlling the nature, extent, territory, or period of the licence related to the 
"use or licence" of an intellectual property right. Also exempted by virtue of the deeming 
section were licensing provisions that protected the licensor's interests in a "technically 
129 Assuming that the manufactured products are competing in the same geographical and product market 
etc. 
130Eagles, above n 17, 2. 
131 Eagles, above n 17, 3. 
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satisfactory exploitation" of the right, and provisions requmng innovation and "know-
how" grant backs. 132 
The use of a "relating to" test was necessarily rather imprecise, and offered little guidance 
about what is a legitimate licensing restraint. 133 The Australian intellectual property 
exemption in section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 also uses a "relating to" test. 
In Transfield v Arla, the only Australian case to have considered the section, judges 
reached opposite conclusions about whether an exclusive dealing clause would be a 
collateral advantage and therefore not "relate" to the license of an intellectual property 
right. 134 Furthermore, as Eagles has observed, it was unclear whether the restrictions in 
section 45(2) were exhaustive or illustrative. 135 
The Department of Trade and Industry's 1988 discussion paper on the Commerce Act 
review stated the concern that the original section 45 went further than providing an 
exemption for the "matters authorised under the various specific statutes relating to 
intellectual property" .136 The Department's major criticism was that section 45 protected 
horizontal arrangements between competitors. 137 The Department did not address the anti-
competitive effects of some vertical licensing agreements that go beyond the scope of the 
132Grant backs are where a licensee making improvements on the licensed technology is required to 
license these improvements back to licensor. Grant backs are discussed below at Part VII C 3. 
133See Department of Trade and Industry A Discussion Paper - Review of the Commerce Act 1986 
(Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington, 1988), 40-42. 
134Mason J held that an exclusive dealing arrangement is simply to ensure adequate exploitation of the 
licensed product and could not therefore be a collateral advantage. See Transfield, above n 60, 42,310. 
Murphy J held that an exclusive dealing arrangement was not exempted under the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) 
and that is was a collateral advantage. See Transfield, above n 60, 42,310. See Appendix A for a full 
discussion of the case. 
135Three interpretations of section 45(2) were possible. First the sub-section may deem certain provisions 
to relate to the use of an intellectual property right. Secondly, the examples may only be illustrative of 
provisions relating to the use of an intellectual property right. Thirdly, the examples may be an exhaustive 
list of provisions relating to the use of an intellectual property right. See Eagles, above n 17, 26. 
136Department of Trade and Industry, above n 133, 40. 
137Department of Trade and Industry, above n 133, 40. 
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original intellectual property right but which seem to fall within the original section 45 
exemption. 
B Licensing Provisions Exempted by Section 45 
The following is a list of common restriction that divide the totality of the right and are 
therefore most likely exempt from the Commerce Act under section 45: 
1 Exclusive licenses 
Exclusive licenses fall squarely within the exemption, as the licensee merely passes on the 
exclusivity inherent in the intellectual property right. Without an exemption many such 
licenses could be per se illegal under section 29. 138 In situations where the exclusivity 
serves to gain collateral advantages, section 36 would still be applicable. 139 
2 Divisions of the totality of rights 
Territorial re trictions, temporal re trictions, and field of use restrictions are mere 
ubdivisions of the rights holder's exclusive rights and gain no collateral advantages. 
Although the licensees may be "restricted", they are permitted to engage in activitie that 
the intellectual property right would otherwise have prohibited. 
138sec text above at Part VII. 
139Thc gaining of collateral advantages is only likely to be possible by this means when there arc no 
substitutes for the licensed product. In thi s situation the licensor will have market dominance and section 
36 could apply. Sec text below at Part XI. 
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3 Production quotas 
Restrictions in production are also likely to fall within the exemption, as technically the 
licensee is permitted to do something that would otherwise have been prohibited. 
C Licensing Provisions Not Exempted by Section 45 
1 Tying of non-statutory intellectual property products 
Tying is the classic example of a collateral advantage and does not fall within the 
exemption. Tying may not be prohibited by section 27 however where competition for the 
supply of the tied product is not significantly affected by the tie.14° Consider the example 
of the patent holder for the brick manufacturing process that ties the licensee to the 
purchase of raw materials. The raw materials used in brick making may have many other 
applications. Suppliers of the raw materials will not be significantly affected by the 
foreclosure of this market opportunity, but the licensee is forced to purchase from an 
inefficient producer. Such a situation could be dealt with by section 36, as the focus of 
inquiry is really the licensor's market dominance in the principal product market, but 
section 36 still requires the purpose of eliminating or restricting competition. If section 27 
would not invalidate the tie, it is unlikely that section 36 would. 
2 Restrictions on composite products 
In Windsurfing International v European Commission 14 1 the licensor restricted the licen e 
of a patented windsurfer sailing rig to the manufacture of the complete product (ie a whole 
windsurfer). This sort of provision may be justifiable as a general field of use restriction if 
140There are also other justifications for tying. See T Frank "The Economic Interest Test and Collective 
Action Problems in Antitrust Tie-in Cases" 61 University of Chicago Law Review 639 (1994). 
141 Windsurfing International v European Commission [1986] 3 CMLR 489. 
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another party is licensed to manufacture for a different field (eg manufacture of rigs for 
DIY consumers) but it was doubtful whether the market here could be divided in such a 
way. The license also provided that the manufacturer only attach the rigs to hulls approved 
by the licensor. Both these provisions were struck down by the Court. The provisions 
were seen as attempts to control an un-patented product (the hulls). The manufacturer 
could designate from whom the licensee was to purchase hulls. Thus the markets for hulls 
and for separate rigs were foreclosed. The court rejected arguments that such provisions 
were necessary for quality control. 
3 Grant back provisions 
Grant back prov1s1ons occur because in the course of use licensees often make 
improvements upon the patent. The licensor will wish to remain competitive in the 
patented field and may wish to license these improvements to other licensees also. Grant 
back clauses have a number of forms with varying degrees of competition law 
significance. 142 The clause may simply deem improvements to be the property of the 
licensor. This is least favourable to the licensee and is the most likely to offend 
competition law as it simply attaches a collateral condition to the license which forecloses 
the market for the improvement.. More innocuous is a clause giving the licensor the option 
to acquire any improvements at a pre-ordained or determinable value (eg market price). 
Alternatively if the licensor only wishes to remain competitive in a market, the grant back 
clause may entitle the licensor only to a "royalty free" non-exclusive license from the 
licensee. 143 A grant back provision will be most acceptable to licensees with exclusive 
rights, as that licensee will not then face the prospect of competition from other licensees. 
A licensee may also demand additional competitive advantages in return for the grant back 
142Melville, above n 15, 1.40. 
143See OECD, above n 23 , 86 quoting United States Department of Justice Guidelines which suggest that 
non-exclusive grant backs are actually pro-competitive. 
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obligation. In the United States the validity of grant back clauses is determined under the 
"rule of reason" standard. 144 
4 Resale price maintenance 
Section 45 does not apply to resale price maintenance. This is assumed always to be anti-
competitive. Note however that section 43 could provide an exemption to this practice. 145 
5 Price fixing 
This is not a licensing issue as such as the arrangement is horizontal (between 
competitors). The arrangement between licensees would not exist by reason of authorising 
something otherwise prohibited by an intellectual property right and section 45 would not 
therefore apply - Price fixing is a collateral advantage. Section 30 would deem such 
conduct to substantially lessen competition under section 27. Intellectual property price 
fixing arrangements are unlikely to contain more that 50 parties so the section 32 
exemption is not applicable. The only New Zealand case to have dealt with intellectual 
property price fixing is HMV v Simmons which concerned the price fixing and resale price 
maintenance of retail record prices. 146 The case was decided under the Trade Practices Act 
144Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp v Stokes and Smith Co 329 US 637 (1946). Transparent-Wrap had 
exclusively licensed Stokes to manufacture and sell patented packaging machines on the condition that 
Stoke assign all improvements back to Transparent-Wrap. The Supreme Court held that such contracts 
were subject to a rule of reason analysis, but the Court noted some of the traditional concerns about 
innovation grant backs . "We are quite aware of the possibilities of abuse in the practice of licensing a 
patent on condition that the licensee assign all improvement patents to the licensor. Conceivably the 
device could be employed with the purpose or effect of violating the antitrust laws. He who acquires two 
patents acquires a double monopoly. As patents are added to patents a whole industry may be regimented. 
The owner of a basis patent might thus perpetuate his control over an indu try long after the basis patent 
expired. Competitors might be eliminated and an industrial monopoly perfected and maintained. Through 
the use of patents pools or multiple licensing agreements the fruits of invention of an entire industry might 
be systematically funnelled into the hands of the original patentee" (Transparent-Wrap, 646). See OECD, 
above n 23, 85 and Melville, above n 15, l.42. 
145Such as for the fact situation in HMV v Simmons [ 1960] NZLR 25. See text at Part X B. 
146HMV, above n 145. 
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1958 which had no equivalent to the current section 45. The Court therefore applied the 
test in the section for general "statutory authorisations" and found that the exemption did 
not apply. 147 
The United States case of US v Paramount Pictures Inc dealt with the practices of the 
major (vertically integrated) film producers which included price discrimination, overly 
restrictive licensing terms, 148 block booking, 149 resource pooling, franchising, resale price 
maintenance, and price fixing. 150 As far as price fixing was concerned, the film licensors 
had set minimum admission prices to be charged by the licensees (the theatres), and the 
"competing" licensors had agreed on these prices between themselves. Thus the price 
fixing was horizontal and vertical (ie resale price maintenance ). 151 The Supreme Court 
held that price fixing amongst competitors was per se illegal under the Sherman Act. 152 
Applying the reasoning used in patent price fixing cases the Court quoted US v Gypsum 
Co:ts3 
The rewards which flow to the patentee and his licensees from the suppression of 
competition through the regulation of an entire industry are not reasonably and 
normally adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly. 
The Court therefore applied a collateral advantages test. The industry regulation was not 
envisaged by the statutory intellectual property right, and here the licensor's actions had 
I47See text at Part X B. 
148In particular conditions relating to when theatres may screen films, and periods that must elapse before 
re-screening. See US v Paramount Pictures Inc 334 US 131 (1947), 144. 
149Block booking is discussed below at Part VII D 3. 
150Paramount, above n 148. 
l5lparamount, above n 148, 142. 
152Paramount, above n 148, 143. 
153 US v Gypsum Co 333 US 364,401 quoted in Paramount, above n 148, 144. 
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gone beyond merely securing the monopoly profits available from the intellectual property 
right. 
6 Exclusive dealing 
Exclusive dealing contracts are similar to tying. Instead of mandating the purchase of 
goods from a designated supplier, the licensor forbids the purchase of goods from 
suppliers other than the licensor. The effect will be the same where the licensee needs the 
goods in question. 154 Exclusive dealing contracts are the reciprocal obligation of exclusive 
licenses. 155 The licensor may be concerned that once having granted an exclusive license, 
the licensee will then market a competing product, thus depriving the licensor of royalties. 
The licensee will then have removed, at no cost, competing goods from the market. These 
contracts are sometimes framed as "best endeavours" clauses. The licensee must use their 
best endeavours to promote the product (ie not sell competing products). Another means 
of effecting an exclusive dealing contract would to require a large "up front" license fee 
deductible from later royalties. In Transfield a best endeavour clause was not held to 
require exclusive dealing. Opinion was divided as to whether an exclusive dealing contract 
would be a collateral advantage.156 Exclusive dealing arrangements are not exempted by 
section 45 because they do not permit something that an intellectual property right would 
otherwise have prohibited. 
Under the Commerce Act exclusive dealing arrangements are subject to the "substantially 
lessening of competition" test in section 27. Fisher & Paykel v Commerce Commission 
demonstrates that such contracts may not always breach the Act. 157 Exclusive dealing 
154A tying arrangement can force licensees to purchase goods that they do not need. 
155See above n 90. 
156See above n 134. 
157 Fisher & Paykel Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1990) 2 NZLR 731 . 
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arrangements may sometimes foster interbrand competition by preventing dealer "free-
riding" on the manufacturer's promotional and servicing efforts. This same rationale could 
be applied to exclusive dealing contracts in intellectual property licenses, providing that 
sufficient interbrand competition exists. 
Where vertically integrated firms are involved, an exclusive dealing arrangement may also 
satisfy the elements of section 29. For example, the licensee or licensor may be active in 
two functional markets. The licensor and licensee would then be competitors. If the 
licensee was prevented by the exclusive dealing arrangement from dealing with further 
third party licensors, the contract would breach section 29 because the contract prevents 
the acquisition of goods or services from the third party licensor, and that third party 
licensor would be a competitor of the licensor party to the licensing contract. 
D Anomalies of Section 45 
1 Patent pooling 
Patent pooling is a horizontal arrangement where some competitors grant licenses to each 
other. Patent pools can also be used as a launch pad for joint research and development. 
To some extent these arrangements are be pro-competitive as each competitor in the pool 
then has access to a greater amount of intellectual property. Problems occur however 
when not all competitors are involved in the pool, and the licenses are granted exclusively 
to the competitors within the pool. Passing on exclusivity already inherent in the 
intellectual property right seeks no advantage collateral to an intellectual property right 
and therefore falls within the section 45 exemption. Although one could argue that the 
agreement to exclude a third party by patent pooling is a collateral advantage and does not 
fairly fall within ection 45, section 45 could still apply even if only one exclusive license 
was granted horizantally. Ironically a prime motivation for revising the original section 45 
was that it permitted horizontal arrangements between competitors - a deficiency that has 
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not been remedied. 158 Because an exclusive horizontal license seeks no advantage 
collateral to the right being licensed, section 45 will exempt the practice. 159 
Where a pool is comprised of exclusive licenses patent pools may operate as exclusionary 
contracts of the type section 29 addresses. 160 As section 29 is currently a per se provision 
(although subject to authorisation) 161 excluding pools from section 45 would effectively 
prohibit the practice outright. 162 Furthermore the Commerce Act has no exception for 
joint ventures as such. 163 It is difficult to justify the discriminatory treatment of tangible 
and intellectual property goods from the operation of section 29 however. The benefits of 
patent pools can be attained without excluding other competitors from the technology. 
As the exemption stands, pools may be challengeable if the pool was likely to have the 
effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining prices for goods or services. 164 
2 Cross licensing 
Cross licensing is the same as patent pooling but between only two competitors. The same 
rules apply. 
158Department of Trade and Industry, above n 133, 41. 
159Furthennore as Eagles, above n 17, 61 , notes, "[n]or is section 36 easily invoked against a patent pool 
given its emphasis on unilateral rather than collective action . 
160Providing that the pool is an arrangement between competitors . Section 29 requires that the parties to 
the exclusionary contract be competitors and that the excluded party be a competitor of one of the parties 
to the contract. As pools are a purely horizontal agreement the section squarely applies. No vertical 
integration in necessary for the section to apply, unlike for vertical exclusive dealing arrangements. See 
text above at Part VII. 
161 See below n 179. 
162Section 29 bans exclusionary contacts outright even if no lessening of competition actually occurs . 
163Section 44(1 )(a) of the Commerce Act makes an exemption from Part II of the Act for partnerships, but 
it most unlikely that parties to a research and development joint venture would want their relationship 
categorised as a partnership because of the joint and several liability that this entails . 
164See Parts VII C 4 & 5. 
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3 Package licensing 
Package licensing (or "block booking" for copyright works) is a vertical practice where a 
licensee must accept, and pay for, additional licenses to the one desired. In an intellectual 
property context this practice is distinguishable from normal tying as a distinction must be 
made between tying ordinary goods to the intellectual property right and imposing 
additional products also subject to an intellectual property right. Strictly speaking, in 
terms of section 45 there is no "collateral" advantage being sought independent of any 
statutory intellectual property right. The licensor is authorising something that would 
otherwise be prohibited by reason of an intellectual property right. It is ironic that this 
practice seems to fall within section 45 as exclusive dealing arrangements and tying of 
non-intellectual property goods are less anti-competitive but fall outside the exemption. A 
possible means of excluding package licensing from the operation of section 45 is 
discussed below however. 
Package licensing can be a particular problem when dealing with copyright collection 
agencies or large entertainment corporations which often have a considerable degree of 
market power. 165 US v Loew's Inc dealt with such a situation. 166 Six major film 
distributors licensed films to television stations on the condition that entire blocks of films 
were licensed. The distributors had not acted in concert so the complaint was limited to 
the manner in which each distributor had licensed the films. TV station WTOP had 
licensed films from Associated Artists Productions Inc. WTOP had to take 99 films 
divided into three groups based on quality. To obtain such classics a "Casablanca" and 
"The Man Who Came to Dinner" WTOP also had to purcha e rights to somewhat less 
popular films such as "Tugboat Annie Sails Again", "Gorilla Man" , and "Tear Gas Squad". 
165The Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society ("AMCOS") and Copyright Licensing Limited 
("CLL") are two such collection agencies in New Zealand. Copyright owners assign their copyrights to the 
agency who then license them for use to the general public . This effectively bars dealing directly with the 
creator of a work for a license. 
l66 LJS V Loew's, above n 59. 
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The Supreme Court held that the films were not substitutes for each other, 167 and thus the 
reasoning appropriate to tying non-intellectual property goods to patent licenses was 
applicable 168 - namely that the statutory monopoly cannot be extended to other 
products. 169 The defendants had sufficient economic power with respect to each "unique" 
product170 and hence section 1 of the Sherman Act was breached per se. 171 
It may be possible for the courts to characterise package licensing as obtaining a collateral 
advantage by holding that the words of section 45 are intended only to apply to the terms 
of single pieces of intellectual property. Thus to fall within the exemption the license 
provision must relate to the specific intellectual property right in respect of which it is 
attached. Where a license for intellectual property right A contains a term mandating the 
license of intellectual property right B, the term in the A license would not permit 
something otherwise prohibited by intellectual property right A - the intellectual property 
right to which the term is attached. The intellectual property right tie could then be viewed 
as a collateral advantage and outside the scope of section 45. This paper suggests that this 
approach is preferable, as it is consistent with the policy goals of both areas of the law, 
and also as the United States cases have treated ties of intellectual property goods and 
non-intellectual property goods in an equal manner. In any case, package licensing 
agreements are most likely to involve a large degree of market power and can therefore 
also be considered under section 36. 172 
167US v Loew's, above n 59, 20. If the films were "fungible" goods then no "tying" could exist as the films 
are all the same product. Contrast this with O'Conner J's statements in Jefferson Parish Hospital , above n 
86, 1571 n 7. 
168US V loew's, above n 59, 20. 
169US V loew's , above n 59, 19. 
I70US V loew's, above n 59, 20. 
171 Although the Court did note that there may be "rare circumstances in which the doctrine we have 
enunciated under § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying arrangements involving patented or 
copyrighted tying products is inapplicable" . (See Loew's, above n 59, 21). The Court did not comment 
what these circumstances might be. 
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E Non-Statutory Intellectual Property Rights 
Under section 45(2) no provision is made for the exemption of non-statutory intellectual 
property rights. Reasons for the lack of such an exemption are purportedly that Parliament 
has not expressly recognised these common law rights (such as breach of confidence and 
passing off) by codifying them, and that the scope of these rights is Jess rigidly defined 
than the scope of statutory intellectual property rights. 173 Nonetheless section 7 of the 
Commerce Act provides a limited exemption for breaches of confidence. 
l Sections 7(2) & 7(3) of the Commerce Act 1986 
Section 7(2) of the Commerce Act provides that nothing in the Act "limits or affects any 
rule of law relating to breaches of confidence". Section 7(3) of the Commerce Act 
provides that "[n]o rule of law referred to in ... subsection (2) of this section affects the 
interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act". It seems clear therefore that the breach 
of confidence action can be used within its bounds to protect intellectual property, but that 
any licensing terms that go beyond the exclusivity expressly afforded by the action will be 
subject to competition law in much the same way as statutory intellectual property 
rights. 174 Hence the "collateral advantages" principle applies to the breach of confidence 
action. 
172Note however that the United States tying and package licensing cases have been brought under§ 1 of 
the Sherman Act - the equivalent of s27 of the Commerce Act. See Jefferson Parish Hospital , above n 86, 
1551. 
173Ministry of Commerce, above n 24, 225-226. 
174Eagles, above n 17, 42. 
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2 "Piggy-back" and "know-how" licensing 
Know-how licensing is now a common form of technology transfer using the breach of 
confidence action. 175 The breach of confidence action can protect non-innovation 
intellectual property such as data, or innovation intellectual property that has not become 
the subject of a statutory intellectual property right. 176 An example of the latter is the 
know-how relating to the use of a patent. 177 Such information will not be revealed in the 
patent specification if possible, 178 thereby extending the patentee's control over the 
innovation - breach of confidence protection does not require disclosure as patent law 
does and there is no limit to the period of protection. Because know-how licenses are 
often included in patent licenses, the term "piggy-back" licensing is sometimes used. 
VIII IS THE INTERFACE BEST REGULATED WITH EXEMPTIONS? 
The section 45 exemption is a rather crude means of regulating the interface. First as 
mentioned, several anomalies exist such as the potential for the exemption of horizontal 
practices and the tying of additional intellectual property licenses. Secondly, the "but for" 
test of section 45 may be too arbitrary for assessing the legitimacy of certain types of 
vertical restraints in particular licensing agreements . This paper purports that interface 
175"Know-how" licensing is now a common form of technology transfer which is not dependant on a 
statutory intellectual property right but on the breach of confidence action. See Calhoun, 17-22, Eagles , 
above n 17, 39-43, and DR Phillips "The [R]evolutionary Treatment of Know-How Licensing Under EEC 
Competition Law" ( 1988) 20 Law & Policy in International Business 205. 
176See WR Cornish "Confidence in Ideas" (1990) l Intellectual Property Journal 3. Breach of confidence 
can be used to protect "ideas" that are unprotectable under copyright law. Although see Wilson v BCNZ 
[ 1990] 2 NZLR 565 where the defendant copied the format of a TV program from the defendant's 
feasibility study. This was held to be a breach of confidence and a copyright infringement even though 
witnesses described the feasibility study as "ideas" or "concepts". Al o see M Gronow "Damages for 
Breach of Confidence" (1994) 5 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 94, and B Markel "Business 
Issues: Breach of Confidence" 53 Saskatchewan Law Review 229 (1989) generally. 
177W Pengilley "Antitrust Law Versus Intellectual Property Law; Where i the Interface?" (1989) 4 
Canterbury Law Review I 03, 136, states that about 50% of patents must be supplemented with additional 
know-how before they are viable. 
178Eagles, above n 17, 4 l. 
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should be regulated by a more flexible statutory test that clearly states the underlying 
economic reasons for providing an exemption. 
Types of licensing provisions must, by their nature, either fall inside or outside the 
exemption. If the provision falls outside the exemption then it will be subjected to the 
rigours of competition law policy without consideration of its merits for encouraging 
innovation. 179 The relevant section of the Commerce Act may be a per se offence or, if a 
competition test applies, analysis will only extend to the effects on allocative economic 
efficiency and not innovative economic efficiency. Innovative efficiency concerns will 
remain unaddressed. On the other hand if a particular type of licensing provision falls 
within the exemption then the danger is that it can be used for anti-competitive purposes. 
Some types of provision, such as temporal restraints, are clearly envisaged by intellectual 
property law. Others, such as tying, are not. In between the two extremes there is a raft of 
provisions which may or may not create an anti-competitive effects beyond the extent 
necessary to maintain the incentives to create. Consider field of use restrictions. The 
benefits of field of use restrictions in copyright licensing are obvious. A film may be 
licensed separately for cinema and television use. This aids exploitation considerably, 
thereby maintaining the incentive to create. A field of use restriction may be framed so that 
it amounts to a fetter on competition however. The ability to discriminate between cinema 
and television means that licensors can restrain television use until the film market is 
properly exploited. This supports an ailing cinema industry at the consumer's expense. 180 
179The Commerce Commission does have the power however to grant authori ations from the Commerce 
Act's application. Under s58 of the Commerce Act authorisations may be granted for conduct that would 
breach s27, s29, and s37 of the Act. A major limitation on this power is that section 59 permits 
authorisations to be granted only in respect of conduct that not already occurred. Section 61 states the 
criteria for determining whether authorisation should be granted. For a section 27 authorisation the 
conduct must " ... in all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in a benefit to the public which 
would outweigh the lessening in competition that would result, or would be likely to result or is deemed to 
result therefrom". For s29 and s 37 authorisations a public benefit test is also applied. In determining 
"public benefit" s3A of the Act instructs the Commerce Commission to "have regard to any efficiencies 
that the Commission considers will result, or will be likely to result from that conduct". Section 3A may 
therefore permit dynamic efficiency factors to have a bearing upon authorisation issues. 
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In Windsurfing the licensee was restricted to using windsurfer rigs on a particular type of 
windsurfer board. The licensor was (effectively) the only manufacturer of thi board. The 
field of use restriction amounted to little more than an exclu ive dealing contract or 
product tie. 
"Quality" restrictions, which probably fall within section 45, are another case in point. The 
licensor will want to ensure that licensees meet certain quality standards to protect the 
image of the product, but quality restriction may also serve to place competitors at a 
disadvantage and allow the vertically integrated licensor to free-ride upon the licensee's 
efforts. 
Given that licensing restrictions may only sometimes disrupt competition for the legitimate 
interests of rights holder, should these restrictions fall within the exemption? If so, the 
conduct in Windsurfer will go unrestrained, but if not. then the utility to both licensor and 
licensee of field of use restrictions will be lost. While competition law does not deem all 
anti-competitive practices to be illegal per se , the "substantially lessening competition" test 
does not extend to an analysis of dynamic economic efficiency criteria. It looks only to the 
effects of a provi ion on allocative efficiency and, in particular, allocative efficiency 
achieved by competition. Thus licensing provisions that do not contribute to innovative 
economic efficiency may nonetheless not infringe section 27 because sufficient competition 
exists in the market. If "but for" exemption provisions are to be the mechanism for 
regulating the interface, then the best solution seems to be to assess the net economic 
effect of the type restriction. If on the whole it is good then it should be exempted. Section 
45 has largely achieved this, but the anomalies of patent pooling and package licensing (if 
18°Film-makers will argue that this form of exploitation is necessary to make film production viable, but 
this would indicate that the either the intellectual property protection for films is inadequate or that the 
product does not match the consumer demand. The reality may be that the television industry could not 
provide sufficient remuneration to encourage production. Home-taping copyright violation may mean 
exploitation solely through television is impractical. The industry would argue that effective cinema 
exploitation is also required to maintain the mystique of the "silver screen" which supports the industry. 
Films may not have the same initial impact on the smaller TV screen . Also see Cornish, above n 28, 309, 
who gives similar examples such as publishing hard back books before paper backs. 
Competition Law (LAWS 525) 
Intellectual Property Right Exemptions 51 
package licensing falls within the exemption) demonstrate the difficulty of drafting a 
precise section that will exempt only the correct classes of licensing provisions. 
A further consideration is that "vertical" licensing prov1s10ns may have substantially 
different effects when licensed horizontally. The anomaly created by exempting exclusive 
licenses, and therefore permitting exclusionary patent pooling, has already been 
mentioned. 181 Ideally therefore it would be preferable to assess individual licensing 
provisions on their merits and in the commercial context in which they occur. The test to 
be applied is whether competition is disrupted only to the extent necessary to maintain the 
incentive to create as envisaged by the original monopoly grant. This more flexible 
approach removes the arbitrary effects (both in favour of and against competition) of 
regulating the interface with a brightline exemption rule such as the "but for" test in 
section 45. Flexibility is one advantage that a "relates to" test has over a "but for" test, as 
the former test is better able to consider the merits of licensing provisions in their 
particular contexts rather than considering types of licensing provisions as a class. 
However the "relates to" test gives no criteria for determining what provisions should and 
should not be exempted. For the present, some of the arbitrary effects of section 45 may 
be mitigated by re-characterising the licensing provision as another type of provision: The 
Winsurfing field of use restriction can be called a tie. 
IX THE COMPETITION PROVISIONS OF THE PATENTS ACT 1953 
A Section 66 of the Patents Act 1953 
Copyright by its nature does provide a total "monopoly" on the product. Independent 
creation of the same work is permitted, as are different "expressions" of the same general 
181 See text above at Part VII D l. OECD, above n 23 , 15, has commented that " ... competition policy in 
the past has often been guided solely by the type of clause used rather than on a total analysis of its 
economic effect in a given context... [T]hat economic effect will often hinge on whether the restrictive 
clause is used in a horizontal or vertical arrangement". 
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idea. There are always likely to be adequate substitutes for copyright works. Patent 
however confers a total monopoly, and innovations by their nature are less likely to have 
substitutes. The Patents Act therefore contains some provisions restraining anti-
competitive practices. 
Section 66 is not an exemption as such (although see section 66(5) below) but operates to 
automatically make void anti-competitive patent licensing provisions. Section 66(1) 
provides that: 
( 1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any condition of a contract for the sale 
or lease of a patented article or of an article made by a patented process or for 
licence to use or work a patented article or process, or relating to any such sale, 
lease, or licence, shall be void in so far as it purports-
(a) To require the purchaser, lessee, or licensee to acquire from the vendor, lessor, 
or licensor, or his nominees, or prohibit him from acquiring from any specified 
person, or from acquiring except from the vendor, lessor, or licensor, or his 
nominees, any articles other than the patented article or an article made by the 
patented process: 
(b) To prohibit the purchaser, lessee, or licensee from using articles (whether 
patented or not) which are not supplied by, or any patented process which does not 
belong to, the vendor, lessor, or licensor, or his nominees, or to restrict the right of 
the purchaser, lessee, or licensee to use any such articles or process . 
Section 66(1)(a) forbids the gaining of collateral advantages in licensing provisions that 
require the licensee to purchase additional types of products from the licensor ("full line 
forcing") or from a third party ("third line forcing") or the gaining of collateral advantages 
by preventing the licensee from purchasing other articles from alternative sources 
("constructive" full and third line forcing) . Section 66(l)(b) prevents the gaining of 
collateral advantages by forbidding licensing provisions that prohibit or restrict the 
licensee's use of patented or non-patented articles or processes not belonging to the 
licensor. 
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The advantage of the provisions in the Patents Act over the Commerce Act is that they 
operate per se. In other words no inquiry into anti-competitive effects is necessary. 
However section 66 simply provides that offending provisions are void: No damages or 
other remedies may be obtained. 
Section 66(5) provides an exception from the operation of section 66(1). 182 The section 
provides that a licensing condition is not void by reason only that it prohibits any person 
from selling goods other than those supplied by a specified person or, in the case of a 
license to use a patented article, that it reserves to the licensee the right to supply new 
parts necessary to keep the patented article in repair. The first limb of section 66(5) 
applies only to selling goods. A licensee could still use other goods when manufacturing, 
use other processes, acquire other goods, or acquire other proce ses. The exemption will 
permit a franchise type arrangement where the (exclusive) licensee ells only the licensor's 
goods to the consumer. Unlike section 66(1)(b), section 66(5) makes no distinction 
between patented and non-patented articles. It would be open to a court to read down 
section 66(5) however and hold that "goods" relates only to patented goods of similar 
type to those regulated in the license. Such an interpretation would restrict the scope of 
section 66(5) to protecting the legitimate interests of a licensor in exploiting the patented 
invention without permitting collateral advantages to be gained. 183 
182Section 66(3) also provides an exception to the operation of section 66( 1 ). A condition may not be void 
if at the time of making the contract the vendor or licensee was willing to sell the articles, or grant a 
license for the use of the article or process, on reasonable terms without the restrictive condition; and that 
the purchaser or licensee is entitled under the contract to relief from the restrictive condition upon giving 
3 months notice to the other party, and is entitled to any compensation if neces ary. Section 66(4) places 
the burden of proof upon the vendor or licensor. 
183This would minimise anti-competitive effect without compromising the objects of exclusive dealing 
agreements such as that in Transfield, above n 60. The Transfield exclusive dealing arrangement was 
aimed to ensure that the licensee used its best endeavours to promote the licensed product and that the 
licensee did not cut the licensor's product out of the market by promoting competing goods. There was 
some argument in Transfield as to whether the licensee was "using" or "selling" the licensed goods 
however. See Appendix A for the conflicting judgments of Stephen J and Murphy J and also above n 134. 
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B Section 47 of the Patents Act 1953 
Sections 47 also bears upon patent licensing agreements. The Commissioner of Patents 
may amend, grant or revoke licenses on the grounds that "the manufacture, use, or sale of 
materials not protected by the patent is unfairly prejudiced by reason of conditions 
imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licenses under the patent, or upon the purchase, 
hire, or use of the patented article or process ... " .184 Clause 8 of the GATT (Uruguay 
Round) Bill 1994 ("the GA TT Bill") proposes to repeal section 4 7 presumably because the 
Commerce Act now governs such conduct rendering the section superfluous. 185 Licensing 
conditions affecting non-patented materials are likely to be outside of the section 45 
exemption and subject to the restrictive trade practices sections in the Commerce Act. 
Section 47 would only have been of significance if "unfairly prejudiced" is an easier test to 
satisfy than "substantially lessening competition", although in practice this is probably a 
moot point. 
C Section 46 of the Patents Act 1953 
The current section 46 permits compulsory licensing where a patented invention is not 
being "worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable", 186 or where the 
"demand for the patented article in New Zealand is not being met on reasonable terms" .187 
This will be amended by the GATT Bill to allow compulsory licensing only where "a 
market for the patented invention is not being supplied, or is not being supplied on 
184Sections 47(1) and 46(2)(e) of the Patents Act. 
185 Article 3 l(k) of TRIPS dispenses with requirement for compulsory licensing provisions in patent 
legislation if such licensing "is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive". 
186Section 46(2)(a) of the Patents Act. 
187Section 46(2)(b) of the Patents Act. 
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reasonable terms, in New Zealand". 188 The change in wording does not reflect the drafting 
of the TRIPS agreement, 189 but does not materially seem to affect the scope of the section. 
Section 46 may be particularly valuable for avoiding the difficulties of section 36 of the 
Commerce Act where a firm refuses to license. Unlike section 36 of the Commerce Act, 
section 46 has no "dominance" or "use" elements to be satisfied. Section 46 is unlikely to 
be of additional help where an invention is not being supplied, as this occurrence is rare 
and a patent holder has no rational reason for refusing to license in these circumstances. 
Where the patented invention is being supplied on unreasonable terms, such as at an 
excessive price because the manufacturer is inefficient or is gaining further monopoly 
profits, then section 46 may be invaluable. The operation of section 46 is dependant on the 
Commissioner of Patents' discretion however, and it may be that in practice the 
Commissioner will be reluctant to judge whether the invention is being supplied at an 
unreasonable price. 
X SECTION 43 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
Section 43(1) provides that nothing in the restrictive trade practices part of the Commerce 
Act "applies in respect of any act, matter, or thing that is, or is of a kind, specifically 
authorised by any enactment or Order in Council mad under any Act" . The test is narrow 
however as indicated in Apple Fields v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board. 190 The 
188Section 46(2) of the Patents Act as will be amended by clause 7 of the GA TI Bill. 
189TRIPS gives no guidelines for the circumstances in which compulsory patent licenses may be granted 
but only makes provisions for when this eventuality occurs. See Article 31 of TRIPS. 
190Apple Fields v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board (1991] l NZLR 257. The case concerned the 
legality of a discriminatory levy imposed on growers that had the effect of discouraging increases in 
production. The levy was imposed under section 31 of the Apple and Pear Marketing Act 197 l that 
permitted the Board to levy all growers, or any class of growers, as the Board thinks fit. The levy allegedly 
breached section 27 of the Commerce Act. The Privy Council could "find nothing which should 
predispose the interpreting court to approach the issue which arises here on the footing that, if the 
imposition of a levy under section 31 of the Act of 1971 prima facie contravenes s 27 of the Act of 1986, 
one should look benevolently expecting to find a provision elsewhere in the Act of 1986 which excuses 
that contravention" (see Apple Fields, 262). The Privy Council then held that "nothing less will do than 
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authorisation must be of the specific act in question, 191 and authorisation in "general" 
terms is insufficiently specific to warrant exemption. 192 As mentioned, the Australian 
"statutory authorisation" exemption expressly excludes statutory intellectual property 
rights from its scope. The New Zealand Act does not, creating the potential for "overkill". 
The utility of section 43 in this respect may be limited as most intellectual property 
statutes state the rights holder's "exclusive" rights in negative terms not susceptible to a 
"specifically authorises" analysis. However the section may have application where section 
45 does not exempt particular arrangements. First, section 45 is framed in negative terms. 
"Positive" licensing obligations may not be exempt. Section 43 would permit a more 
comprehensive assessment of the intended scope monopoly grant by looking to the nature 
of the statutory scheme, but the "specifically authorises" may still be difficult to satisfy. 
Secondly, resale price maintenance is not exempted under section 45, but could be under 
section 43. Thirdly, section 45 provides no exemption from section 36, and if section 
36(2) is limited to the judicial enforcement of intellectual property rights, section 43 may 
apply. 
A Section 66(5) of the Patents Act 1953 
As mentioned section 66(5) of the Patents Act provides that licensing provisions requiring 
a licensee to sell only the goods of the licensor will not be struck down by the provisions 
of the Patents Act. Such an exclusive dealing licensing provision would not fall within the 
section 45 exemption because it does not authorise something prohibited by an intellectual 
property right. However section 43 may provide an exemption for this practice if it is 
"specifically authorised" by the Patents Act. In 1953 this "restrictive practice" was 
considered acceptable. The Patents Act pre-dates any competition law in New Zealand by 
either a statutory authorisation of the very act in question or, if it is one of a class or kind of authorised 
acts, that the whole authorised class would, if not so authorised, fall foul of the prohibitions in Part II of 
the [Commerce Act]" (see Apple Fields, 265) . Clearly this is a test of the highest threshold . 
191Apple Fields, above n 190,265. 
192Section 43(2) of the Commerce Act. 
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5 years, and thus a licensee at the time had no recourse to contest such a licensing 
provision. It could be argued however that section 66(5) does not offer positive 
authorisation for this act. It states only that section 66( 1) of the Patents Act shall not 
strike it down. No mention is made of the effect of other Acts on such a clause. 
It is worth noting the attitude of the Australian High Court in discussing the equivalent 
Australian provisions in Transfield v Arla. 193 In Transfield the validity of a "best 
endeavours" clause was contested. 194 The clause purportedly required the licensee to use 
its best endeavours in promoting the licensed product and prevented the licensee from 
dealing in competing products. While the judgments variously considered the Patents Act 
1952 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), unfortunately none of the judges who 
went on to examine the Trade Practices Act exemption had held that the "best 
endeavours" clause amounted to an exclusive dealing arrangement that precluded the 
licensee from selling competitor's products. Therefore as the clause (in the relevant 
judgments) did not fall within the Patents Act exemption, the consideration of the Trade 
Practices Act in the case cannot on its own be support for the proposition that section 
66(5) is subject to competition law. However Murphy J, who did not specifically address 
the Trade Practices Act, observed that the Australian equivalent of section 66(5) was 
inconsistent with modern legislative practice. While Transfield, with the exception of 
Murphy J's judgment, is inconclusive, the restrictive provisions "exempted" in sections 
66(5) are probably subject to Commerce Act scrutiny because of the high threshold for 
"specifically authorise". 
193Transfield, above n 60. 
194See the casenote in Appendix A for a full discussion of the case. 
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B HMVv Simmons 
HMV v Simmons is the only New Zealand case to have dealt with an exemption for an 
intellectual property practice. 195 The New Zealand Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry sought to set minimum wholesale and retail prices and maximum retail margins 
for records. They argued that the compulsory license provisions of the Copyright Act 
1913 "expressly authorised" the arrangement in terms of section 19(4) of the Trade 
Practices Act 1958 .196 This was because royalties were to be calculated as a percentage of 
the retail price. To ascertain the royalties owing, it was necessary to establish standard 
prices. The Court rejected this argument on three grounds: The Federation had attempted 
to do more than was necessary to facilitate use of the compulsory license, it was not 
necessary in any case to fix prices in to compute royalties, 197 and nowhere did the 
Copyright Act state specifically, or by implication, that such price fixing was 
permissible. 198 
C Refusals to License 
It could be argued that intellectual property law statutes specifically authorise rights 
holders not to license their innovations. The advantage of using section 43 in this situation 
is that a potential exemption to section 36 is obtained. The right to maintain exclusivity by 
refusing to license is implicit in the exclusive rights provisions of the statutes, but may not 
pass the high threshold of "specifically authorise". Furthermore the Copyright Act contains 
some exceptions to the right not to license as does the Patents Act. 199 
195HMV, above n 145. 
196Section 19(4) stated that "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authori e the making of an order 
in respect of a trade practice expressly authorised by any enactment" (emphasis added) . This is equivalent 
to section 43 of the Commerce Act 1986. 
197 HMV, above n 145, 30. 
198HMV, above n 145, 29. 
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XI SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATING TO LICENSING TERMS 
Intellectual property law disrupts competition by providing exclusive rights for innovators 
to prevent competitors from appropriating the innovation, thereby facilitating the recovery 
of the fixed costs of development and encouraging innovation. Competition law doe not 
therefore attack the existence of intellectual property rights but only the manner in which 
those rights are used. Licensing terms that gain advantages collateral to the intellectual 
property right will be subject to Commerce Act scrutiny. 
A licensor is free to divide and assign the totality of the rights granted by intellectual 
property law. Licensing terms such as restricted territories, temporal limitations, field of 
use restrictions, and exclusive licenses are all "permissive" licensing terms that fall within 
the section 45 exemption. These terms merely permit something that would otherwi e be 
prohibited because of the intellectual property right and therefore no collateral advantage 
are gained. Licensing provisions such as product ties, grant backs, and exclusive dealing 
arrangements are not permissive and instead go beyond the scope of intellectual property 
rights by obtaining collateral advantages and are therefore subject to competition law. 
Section 45 cannot exempt these practices as they do not permit something that would 
otherwise be prohibited by an intellectual property right. The drafting of section 45 
produces two anomalous results for the regulation of the interface by economic principle. 
First, package licensing appears to fall within the exemption as the licensing terms only 
permit something that intellectual property rights would otherwise prohibit. A court would 
probably not exempt package licensing, however, as the licensing term tying another 
intellectual property product does not relate to the specific intellectual property to which 
that term is attached. Secondly, patent pooling and cross-licensing fall within the section 
45 exemption. This results from the drafting of section 45 as a "but for" test for vertical 
practices. Exclusive licensing, in itself, is harmless as a vertical practice, but horizontal 
199See s46 & 47 of the Patents Act discussed in the text at Parts IX B & C, and s22 of the Copyright Act 
which mandates the compulsory licensing of musical work for making sound recordings if the statutory 
formalities are complied with. See text at Part IV B. 
Competition Law (LAWS 525) 
Intellectual Property Right Exemptions 60 
exclusive licensing is an exclusionary practice outside of the scope of the intellectual 
property right. 
The compulsory licensing provisions of the Patents Act limit the market power conferred 
by the patent monopoly, and section 66 of the Patents Act provides some useful per se 
prohibitions against gaining collateral advantages. Section 43 of the Commerce Act is 
unlikely to be of much use as an exemption for intellectual property practices, and section 
7 operates by much the same principles as section 45. 
Licensing terms which do not fall within section 45 will be subject to the usually 
competition law tests before the provisions of the Act can be breached, and licensing 
practices that are exempted are still examinable under section 36 and sections 37 & 38. 
XII SECTION 36 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 - REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
As mentioned above,200 passing on the exclusivity already inherent in an intellectual 
property right will fall within the section 45 exemption as, other things being equal, no 
collateral advantage is gained. However where the licensor is a dominant firm, and as a 
consequence there are few substitutes for the licensed product, maintaining exclusivity by 
refusing to license (or by licensing to only one firm) may foreclose market opportunities to 
competitors of the exclusive licensee who need the license or licensed product to compete. 
Because the section 45 exemption does not apply to section 36, refusals to license by 
dominant firms are subject to the Commerce Act. 
Section 36(1) prevents a firm using a dominant position in a market for a pro cribed 
purpose such as restricting market entry or inhibiting competition in a market. There are 
three elements to be satisfied, namely "dominance" in a market, "use" of that dominance, 
200see text above at Part VII B 1. 
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and "purpose". Additionally the assessment of dominance is to a large degree subject to 
the vagaries of defining the relevant market. Even if the elements of section 36(1) can be 
established, section 36(2) provides a limited exemption which is discussed below. Before 
analysing the elements of section 36, it is helpful to consider why a licensor may refuse to 
license. 
XIII WHY REFUSE TO LICENSE? 
Section 36 will apply when a firm in a dominant position uses that dominance to eliminate 
firms from a market, restrain firms from competing in a market, or to hinder competition 
in a market.201 Section 36 is not breached when a dominant firm's conduct has one of these 
effects, but only when the firrn uses its dominant position for one of these purposes. What 
rational motives will a licensor have for engaging in such conduct by refusing to license? 
A Efficiency of Exploitation 
Refusing to license, or refusing to license to more than one licensee, may permit the 
intellectual property right to be exploited more efficiently than with many licensees. If 
intellectual property rights holder refuses to license in order to reserve for itself the right 
to manufacture the product, or if it licenses to only one firm (perhaps a subsidiary or other 
closely related firm) then intrabrand competition is restrained - that is, the competition 
between dealers of the same product. lnterbrand competition is the competition between 
dealers of substitutable (ie competing) products and cannot be affected by a refusal to 
license. Thus while exclusive licenses may affect individual competitors, the effect on the 
overall market can be pro-competitive because interbrand competition is promoted. 202 
201 Section 36( I )(a)-(c) of the Commerce Act. 
202Note that the arguments in favour of limited vertical restraints are directed at achieving allocative, not 
innovative, economic efficiency. Furthermore these arguments apply only to allocative efficiency achieved 
by competition and not efficiency achieved by monopoly. Nonetheless these arguments still have relevance 
for intellectual property. 
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Thus in Fisher & Paykel v Commerce Commission the Court noted that "[w]hen dealing 
with a vertical restraint... it is important to look at the effect of the restraint on 
competition in the market and not at its effect on the competitiveness of individual buyers 
and sellers". 203 
The reasons for granting exclusive contracts for tangible goods can be applied to 
intellectual property goods,204 and the most fundamental justification for exclusive 
territories or licensing205 is the problem of the "free rider" .206 If licensees are not insulated 
from competing licensees then there will be little incentive for to engage in active 
promotion as other licensees will "free ride" on these efforts.207 Licensees are also likely to 
203Fisher & Paykel, above n 157, 759-760. The case concerned exclusive dealing contracts, the reciprocal 
vertical restraint of exclusive territories, but the reasoning is still applicable. The Court cited the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Continental 1V, above n 102, 583, with disapproval. The Supreme 
Court, while acknowledging that "[v]ertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the 
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products", focused on the 
disadvantages of exclusive dealerships such as the inability of consumers to compare goods side by side 
etc. See Fisher & Paykel, 762-763. 
204Note however that most of these arguments have been applied at the functional levels of manufacture 
and distribution rather than innovation and manufacture. Furthermore, arguments relating to ease of 
distribution that apply to tangible goods do not sit as easily with intangible goods - A licensor will only 
ever have to distribute the product to the manufacturer once whereupon the product can be duplicated by 
the licensee without further difficulties . A distributor of tangible goods must of course have access to a 
continual supply. 
205Exclusive territories is the equivalent tangible products vertical restraint. Of course intellectual 
property exclusive licenses are usually limited to a particular territory also, but the territory is usually an 
entire jurisdiction rather than just a suburb. 
206see G A Hay "The Free Rider Rationale and Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered" 56 Antitrust 
Law Journal 27 (1987) generally. 
207Toese arguments are frequently made in respect of parallel importation which is a simple means of 
circumventing an exclusive license. For example see Recording Industry Association of New Zealand 
(RIANZ) RIANZ 1993 Yearbook (RIANZ, Wellington, 1993), 21-22. "While RIANZ supports the 
Government's aim of encouraging competition it has to be recognised that market evidence of parallel 
imported records shows some prices being up to 100% higher than legitimate product. It is RIANZ's view 
that any relaxation of the Import provisions will only encourage unfair competition resulting in free-
riding, profiteering and unjust enrichment which would be of no benefit to consumers and contrary to the 
public interest" . The Yearbook also contains a 1988 independent report on parallel importation 
commissioned by the British Government. "The UK Trade an Industry Report. .. stated that the economic 
rationale for copyright law is that they [sic] create and protect property rights which promote economic 
efficiency. The incentive to invest now for profit later is maintained through copyright laws that prohibit 
opportunistic behaviour such as free riders skimming the market". This last proposition i not strictly true 
however. The incentive scheme of copyright is not compromised by parallel importing itself (or 
production by competing licensees) as royalties have already been paid on the imported goods. Only if 
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demand exclusive licenses before investing the sunk costs in tooling-up and developing 
markets.208 The prospect of free-riding competitors is not much of an inducement to enter 
into, and develop, new markets when the fruits of the labour will be appropriated by other 
licensees.209 In addition to free riding on promotional efforts, subsequent licensees may 
not produce goods of the same high standards as the incumbent licensees and may free 
ride on the existing reputation for quality and eventually damage the product's 
reputation.210 
Because multiple licensees all pay royalties, the incentive for the rights holder to innovate 
is not diminished. Therefore refusals to license can only be justified if competing licensees 
would affect the marketing of the commodity211 and that this intrabrand competition 
would lessen overall sales.212 Overall sales will remain unaffected where "free riding" 
cannot occur because the product requires little promotion or market development,213 or if 
the free riding does not deter licensees from entering the market. 
the activities of the parallel importing has the effect of disrupting marketing strategies to the point where 
overall sales are decreased can intrabrand competition affect the incentive to create. 
208Tois "dynamic", rather than "static", aspect of allocative efficiency is often overlooked. 
209Toese were the very arguments submitted in the Statements of Claim in the aborted Range Rover 
litigation. Motor Corp claimed that it had invested substantial amounts of money and effort into raising 
the profile of the Range Rover in New Zealand, and did not want Phillip Mills Motors free riding on its 
efforts by subverting the exclusive territorial license through parallel importation . See Hutchings above n 
57. 
21 °'fhis argument was also raised by Motor Corp. Phillip Mills was importing Range Rovers made to 
overseas specifications. The engine had been manufactured for different fuel types, and the cars' use in 
New Zealand would damage the engines, and eventually the cars' reputation for reliability. 
211 Consideration should also be given to whether the exclusive license created the inducement for the 
"first" licensee to enter and develop the market. 
212For example, a typical music industry marketing practice is not to release a new album until the artist 
tours the country. The album can then be "hyped". By capitalising on the anticipation and excitement of 
the tour, a carefully timed release can result in greater total sales than would otherwise arise. Competing 
manufacturers of the album, or the ability to parallel import, may frustrate the adoption of such marketing 
strategies. The disadvantage of this marketing strategy is that as New Zealand is a small and relatively 
unimportant market, consumers must wait for considerable periods of time for some albums to become 
available. 
213See text at Part XIII D I where Volvo refused to license a competitor to manufacture its car body 
panels. Competition in door panel production could not affect overall sales, regardless of the frustration of 
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The commentators that believe restriction of intrabrand competition is permissible attach 
one qualification - that substantial interbrand competition needs to exist to temper the 
market power that would otherwise be accrue to exclusive licensees.214 Where the rights 
holder is in a dominant position however, 215 by definition, substantial interbrand 
competition will not exist. Hence no matter how marketing plans are affected by free 
riders, if there are no substitutes for the product then the consumer cannot be diverted to a 
competing brand, and if the product is relatively essential, bad marketing strategies216 will 
not affect overall demand as the consumer has no option but to purchase it. 
B Collateral Advantages 
In general, intellectual property rights holders (whether dominant or not) will want to gain 
"monopoly" profits on the innovation itself but at the same time keep the cost to the 
consumer as low as possible to encourage consumption. Licensing the most efficient 
manufacturer, or competing manufacturers (if marketing constraints do not exist), will 
achieve this goal. 
When the licensor is in a dominant position in a market there is, by definition, no effective 
competition. Consumers must purchase from the licensor's designated manufacturers if 
they want the product. This permits pricing discretion on the part of the manufacturer, 
especially if the product demand is "inelastic" (ie the product i a necessity rather than a 
marketing plans, because the consumer having previously purchased a Volvo car and then damaged the 
door must buy a replacement. 
214See F H Easterbrook "Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason" 53 Antitrust Law Journal 135 
(1984) generally and Hay, above n 206, 30. 
215Note that cases such as Fisher & Paykel, above n 157, and Continental TV, above n 102, have all been 
brought under statutory provisions such as s27 that do not require dominance for a breach but do require a 
lessening of competition. 
2161n any case the licensor can undertake to rai e consumer awareness of the product. ote that the type of 
promotional effort often referred to as a justification for preventing dealer free riding is imply "in-store" 
service. See Hay, above n 206, 29 . Such ervice will be unnecessary where the product is relatively 
essential, as in the latest patent innovation for industrial application or a copyright commodity such as 
recorded music when monopolised by a single collection society. 
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luxury and as a result sales are not significantly affected by price increases). In the modern 
world access to many types innovation is a "necessity" for business survival or leisure.217 
There is no need to restrict supply of such commodities to maintain "desirability".218 While 
obtaining monopoly profits in respect of the innovation is permissible (as it provides the 
incentive to innovate), market dominance also permits obtaining monopoly profits on the 
manufacture of the innovation. Where the (inefficient) manufacturer is a subsidiary of the 
licensor, the licensor may refuse to license to a competing manufacturer in order to gain 
the collateral advantage of monopoly profits on the manufacture of the goods, or at least 
to keep the inefficient subsidiary in business.219 This furthers neither the policy objectives 
of intellectual property law nor competition law. 
217Consider for example a "luxury" such as recorded popular music . The licensing of recorded music for 
broadcast is in a sense "monopolised" by the Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners' Society 
("AMCOS"). Yet AMCOS licensees the use of this commodity to competing radio stations. This 
intrabrand competition does not affect overall demand for broadcasted music because it is a relatively 
indispensable commodity and their is no interbrand competition. Yet it would be within AMCOS's power, 
if not restrained by competition law, to license only a single broadcaster. This single broadcaster could 
remain inefficient with impunity and could monopolise the market for radio broadcast in general. For 
example competing radio stations could not continue to broadcast the news without access to music and 
would be forced out of the market. 
2180ften greater general access to innovation heightens the necessity of access to the innovation in order 
to remain competitive. Consider the legal database LEXIS . If only a few firms nationwide have access, 
then LEXIS is not really a necessity. When most law firms have access to LEXIS , every firm must also 
have access to remain competitive and avoid malpractice suits. The same reasoning applies to many 
"luxuries" as well. When most people have a video recorder, it becomes regarded as a necessity. Sales do 
not then rely on any "novelty" or "exclusivity" factor. 
219Note that Coase argued that an economically rational firm will expand and vertically integrate when 
the costs of contracting out work exceed the costs of expansion. In principle when the reverse becomes 
true, a firm should begin to contract out work again. See RH Coase (ed OE Williamson & S G Winter) 
The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1991). The probable reasons for refusing to license in this situation are the gaining of anti-competitive 
advantages (if competition law does not intervene), empire building, and the costs already invested in the 
vertical integration which a corporation will be unwilling to abandon. See also K McMahon "Refusals to 
Supply by Corporations With Substantial Market Power" (1994) 22 Australian Business Law Review 7, 
11. "The most important justification for a refusal to deal on efficiency grounds is vertical integration . A 
refusal to deal will often involve efforts to cut off a retailer in order to vertically integrate into the retail 
distribution of the market. It has been argued that a monopolist should only be permitted to take over the 
lower level operations of a distributor if it is at least as efficient as the lower-level firm. Substitution of the 
monopolist will then set the price to the consumer at the optimum monopoly level" . If this argument is 
true then it follows that vertical integration should be reversed by compulsory licensing, or orders to 
supply, when the vertically integrated firm is less efficient than a potential competitor at the lower 
functional level. The integrated firm need not abandon the lower functional level altogether but must at 
least permit competition from more efficient firms. 
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In addition to licensors gaining collateral advantages by monopolising different functional 
markets (ie manufacture), refusals to license can also be used to monopolise different 
product markets. Consider the facts of A B Volvo v Erik Veng.220 Volvo had the design 
copyright protection for the body panels for its cars, and refused to license the 
manufacturing rights to competitors. In the actual case, decided under article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome, 221 the Court did not order a compulsory license, as the monopolisation of 
the different functional market of manufacture was considered within the scope of the 
intellectual property right and was therefore not a collateral advantage. This is discussed 
further below. Consider this variation of the facts however. Suppose that the case involved 
door panels specifically, and that most purchasers of new door panels have been involved 
in accidents. The consumer will want to purchase a package of the door and the glass 
window. Suppose that the market for door windows is competitive, and that Volvo 
competes in this market. If Volvo refuses to license the rights to door manufacture to 
competitors, even for a royalty reflecting the development costs, then Volvo is able to 
monopolise the different product market of glass windows. Eliminating competition in this 
associated product market would not encourage long term efficiency and would permit 
monopoly profits on non-innovation products that involve no development costs. 
Therefore the ability to monopolise different functional and product markets will be an 
incentive to refuse to license. 
XIV THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 36 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
A "Dominant Position" and Market Definition 
Section 36 of the Commerce Act has a threshold of market dominance, and the threshold 
is high.222 The first issue under section 36 is what degree of market power is created by an 
220A B Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) limited [1987) ECR 62 11. 
22 1See n 264 below for the full text of article 86. 
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intellectual property right? While intellectual property rights are sometimes described as 
statutory monopolies, it must be remembered that the monopoly granted is only over a 
single product. The Commerce Act is concerned with market dominance. Whether the 
intellectual property right creates market dominance will largely depend on whether there 
are substitutes for the protected product.223 
The United States courts have readily inferred market power in the presence of intellectual 
property rights. In US v Loew's the Supreme Court observed that the "requisite economic 
power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted" .224 More recently 
the majority in Jefferson Parish Hospital stated that "if the Government has granted the 
seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to 
buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power".225 
The term "market dominance", as used in Loew's, may have a different meaning in the 
United States,226 and these assessments of market power resulting from intellectual 
222Section 3(8) of the Commerce Act states that a dominant position is where a firm may exercise a 
dominant influence over the production acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in a market, and 
regard shall be had to market share, technical expertise, access to materials and capital, and the extent 
that the firm is constrained by the conduct of competitors, potential competitors, and suppliers and 
acquires of the goods or services. Generally speaking a dominant position involves an element of 
discretionary market power. See Re Continental Can Co Inc [1972) CMLR DI I. In Telecom Corp of NZ 
Ltd v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 429, 442 Richardson J emphasised the high threshold of 
section 36. "Clearly the dominance test sets a rigorous threshold. It is not sufficient that the influence be 
advantageous or powerful. It must be dominant. The word comes from the Latin dominus meaning master. 
Only one person can be dominant in a particular aspect of a market at any one time. Not surprisingly 
standard dictionaries give meanings such as 'ruling', 'governing', 'commanding', 'reigning', 'ascendant', 
'prevailing', and 'paramount'". See M Berry et al. Gault on Commercial ww (Brooker & Friend, 
Wellington, 1994) CA3. l 2-13 generally. 
223See OECD, above n 23, 16-17. 
224 US v Loew's, above n 59, 18, citing IBM, above n 101. 
225Jejferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1560. 
226 US v Loew's, above n 59, 18. T Weston "Dominance: Where To?" Fifth Annual Workshop of the 
Competition Law & Policy Institute of New Zealand, 4, notes that prior to Telecom v Commerce 
Commission [ 1992) 3 NZLR 429 "dominant position" had been assumed in New Zealand to mean a "high 
degree of market power" which corresponded with the "monopoly power" test in §2 of the Sherman Act 
and with "dominant position" in article 86 of the Treaty of Rome (seen 264 below). Weston, 4, states that 
the Court of Appeal in Telecom attacked that assumption "head-on" creating a stricter threshold. The 
Court did not regard market share as determinative and emphasised the importance of market constraints 
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property rights must be considered in context for any useful application to section 36 of 
the Commerce Act. The above cases were both applying section 1 of the Sherman Act, 227 
which is roughly equivalent to section 27 of the Commerce Act. Where market power is 
present however the section operates as a per se offence. In a tying situation US v Loew's 
indicates that the potential for coercion will indicate market power. The seller "by virtue of 
his position in the market for the tying product, has economic leverage sufficient to induce 
his customers to take the tied product along with the tying item". 228 This does not 
necessarily suggest that market power in the United States that would lead to a per se 
application of section 1 of the Sherman Act is the same as market dominance in the 
Commerce Act. Even if the threshold for dominance in the United States is as high as 
section 36, the approach to market definition in Loew's may be too flexible for the 
Commerce Act. The Supreme Court argued that sufficient economic power attached to 
each "unique" film but conceded that the films also had substitutes. The Court commented 
that:229 
... the mere presence of competing substitutes for the tying product, here taking the 
form of other programming material as well as other feature films, is insufficient 
to destroy the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the copyrighted 
product. 
The result in Loew's may be a product of the difficult issue of market definition where 
partial substitutes exist which have a high cross-elasticity of demand,230 but prima facie 
in assessing dominance (see s3(8)(c)). See also R H Patterson "Dominance: Where To?" Fifth Annual 
Workshop of the Competition Law & Policy Institute of New Zealand. 
227See text at n 107. 
228US V Loew's, above n 59, 18. 
229US V Loew's, above n 59, 20. 
230See G A Hay "Market Definition and Market Dominance: Issues from the Davids-QIW Merger Case" 
1994 Fifth Annual Workshop of the Competition Law & Policy Institute of New Zealand Volume 2, for a 
discussion of Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Attorney General (1994) ATPR <JI 41-304 where the author 
considers the affect of "indirect" substitutes on market definition. In Davids Holdings the Court held that 
private retailer grocery supplies were not substitutes for chain-store "supermarket" grocery supplies with 
the effect that a merger of the only wholesaler supplying the private retailers created a a substantial degree 
of market power (the Australian equivalent, but lower threshold, of "dominant position in a market"). 
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the case suggests that the dominance threshold is lower than in New Zealand. Steven J's 
comments in Jefferson were based upon precedent only and were unsupported by analysis. 
In the same judgment however O'Conner J disagreed with the traditional approach to 
market power and intellectual property rights.231 
A common misconception has been that a patent or copyright, a high market share, 
or a unique product that competitors are not able to offer sufficies to demonstrate 
market power. While each of these three factors might help to give market power 
to a seller, it is also possible that a seller in these situations will have no market 
power: for example, a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if 
there are close substitutes for the patented product. 
O'Conner J's approach seems preferable, for if substitutes for the product exist it will be 
difficult for an intellectual property rights holder to gain collateral advantages by refusing 
to license. 
The difference in the copyright and patent "monopolies" has bearing here. The threshold 
for copyright protection is low, but the product monopoly is not complete. Independent 
creation of the same work is permitted, and the underlying ideas of the work are not 
protected (when the idea-expression dichotomy is properly observed). As a result there 
may many substitutes for a single copyright work, such as a novel or a textbook.232 
231 Jefferson Parish Hospital, above n 86, 1571 n 7. 
232Although some copyright works may fairly be said to have no substitutes and thereby confer market 
dominance. Consider Abraham Zapruder's film of President Kennedy's assassination which was the 
subject of copyright litigation in Times Incorporated v Bernard Geis Associates 293 F Supp 130 (I 968). 
The film was purchased by Time magazine and released only to the federal agencies investigating the 
crime. Time magazine then published over the years select frames from the footage but not the complete 
film. Researcher J Thompson was consistently denied a copyright license to publish portions of the footage 
in his book on the assassination. Time's response to his requests was that "it 'was impossible' to grant 
permission to use the Zapruder frames, that it was corporation policy 'not to allow anyone the use of any 
part of this film in the United States', that the film was considered 'an invaluable asset of the corporation', 
and that 'its use will be limited to our publications and enterprises". See Times Incorporated, 138. Clearly 
this copyright work was so unique that no substitutes existed. Time's monopolisation of this "historic 
document" was not challenged in anti-trust law however, but was dealt with by the monopoly restraints 
implicit in the copyright scheme itself. Although a valid copyright subsisted in the film, Wyatt J held that 
Thompson's use of it was a "fair use" given the "public interest in having the fullest information available 
on the murder of President Kennedy". Moreover, Thompson was not a competitor of Times, and his use of 
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Contrast this with patent protection.233 A total product monopoly is granted precluding 
independent creation and the protection extends to ideas which are at the forefront of 
technological advancement. The period of protection is shorter, and there are stringent 
registration requirements, but when in force the patent product monopoly is much more 
complete. Specific illustrations will highlight the differences. Holding the copyright in a 
novel will create no market dominance. A competitor can easily gain access to other 
novels, and as ideas are not protected, gain access to novels with similar story lines. 
Market dominance is only an issue in copyright cases where collection ocieties or large 
corporations are involved that hold many copyrights. Now consider patents. Where a fllID 
has developed a new drug it may well be that there are few, if any, adequate substitutes. 
The same is true for many manufacturing innovations. 234 Furthermore, in highly 
competitive businesses access to the most up-to-date technology is crucial for success. 
B "Use" of a Dominant Position235 
Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd established that "use" was a distinct 
element in section 36236 and should be interpreted without pejorative connotations.237 
Therefore "use" provides the causal link between the existence of market power and the 
the frames in his book could be expected to enhance the value of the film to Time. See Time Incorporated, 
146. 
233See R J Hoerner "The Antitrust Significance of a Patent's Exclusionary Power" 60 Antitrust Law 
Journal 867 (1992). 
234Table 5-7 of the Contractor survey, above n 78, suggests that only 27% of patent licensors face no 
competition. This still means that large numbers of patentee's have market dominance however. See 
OECD, above n 23, 16. 
235See Y van Roy in Gault on Commercial Law, above n 222, CA36.08 generally. 
236Aithough note the comments of Gault J in Geotherm that "[t]here will be circumstances in which the 
use of the market position and the purpose are not easily separated but the two requirements must be kept 
in mind". Also see Gault J's comments in Clear Communications, 413 , TCLR, that "[i]n most 
circumstances the use and the purpose will nt be easily separated and need not be". 
237Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd (1989) ATPR '1140-925. 
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anti-competitive purpose.238 It is one of the most problematic elements of the Commerce 
Act. 
1 "Use" in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd 
In Queensland Wire Broken Hill Pty Co ("BHP") manufactured the "Y-bar" - a 
component in star picket posts which were the most popular type of fencing posts in rural 
Australia. BHP manufactured 99% of Australia's star picket posts and did not supply the 
Y-bar (at affordable prices) to any other star picket post manufacturers. Y-bars were the 
only item of BHP's catalogue that it refused to supply. BHP also manufactured fencing 
wire and sold complete fencing packages which included wire and star picket posts. 
Queensland Wire Industries ("QWI") was a manufacturer of fencing wire and was BHP's 
only competitor for certain types of wire. QWI could not manufacture star picket posts 
because it could not obtain Y-bars at competitive prices. QWI argued that BHP was using 
its market power in Y-bars to prevent QWI from entering and competing in the market for 
star picket posts (and also as a consequence, the market for fencing packages).239 The 
Australian High Court offered a test for "use":240 
In effectively refusing to supply Y-bar to the appellant, BHP is taking advantage 
of its substantial market power. It is only by virtue of its control of the market and 
the absence of other suppliers that BHP can afford, in a commercial sense, to 
withhold Y-bar from the appellant. If BHP lacked that market power - in other 
words, if it were operating in a competitive market - it is highly unlikely that it 
would stand by, without any effort to compete, and allow the appellant to secure 
its supply of Y-bar from a competitor. 
238Natwest Australia Bank Ltd v Baral Gerrard Strapping Systems Pty Ltd ( I 992) A TPR 'I[ 41 - I 96, 
40,644. 
239The fencing packages, which include wire, are an example of refusals to supply being used not just to 
gain collateral advantages from monopolising different functional markets , but al so as a means to 
monopolise different product markets. 
240Queensland Wire, above n 237, 50,011 per Mason CJ & Wilson J. 
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Applying this test in New Zealand the inquiry is whether the conduct was only possible 
because of market dominance, rather than the lower Australian threshold of market power. 
The test was applied in this way in Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port of Nelson 
Ltd. The Port of Nelson was the only deep water port facility in the northern part of the 
South Island. Port of Nelson Ltd ("PNL") sought to tie stevedoring equipment services to 
wharfage fees. 241 Union Shipping objected. The Court held that the tie breached section 
27 and section 36 of the Commerce Act. About section 36 McGechan J commented:242 
If a person simply acts in a normal competitive fashion, as he would whether 
dominant or not, that person hardly can be said to be "using dominance" ... We do 
not accept that in imposing a requirement for plant hire, or additional payment, 
[Port of Nelson Ltd] is acting as it would in a competitive situation, and is not 
using its dominant position. Its present demands are possible only because of its 
dominant position. Its demands, at times stark, are a use of that dominance. 
The difficulty with the Queensland Wire test is that it will not embrace conduct that may 
be engaged in by all firms but will only be anti-competitive when engaged in by firms with 
market dominance. Pricing at marginal cost is one example of a practice which is 
competitive when done by small firms but may be anti-competitive when done by 
dominant firms: Economies of scale resulting from the dominance mean that marginal 
price will be lower than that of market entrants and, where the dominant firm was 
previously pricing above marginal cost, the adoption of a marginal cost pricing structure 
then takes on a predatory nature that excludes competitors from markets. 
The Queensland Wire test (arguably correctly) states that dominance must have been 
"used" if a non-dominant firm could not have acted in the same way, but this doe not 
preclude a finding that dominance could have been "used" if the conduct was possible by a 
non-dominant firm. The effect of the Queensland Wire decision however is to focus the 
241 Technically thi is not a tie but an exclusive dealing arrangement as the consumer is not forced to take 
unwanted service but only prevented from obtaining these services from elsewhere. 
242Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port of Nelson Ltd ( 1990) 3 NZBLC 'I[ 99- 182, 101 ,645. 
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inquiry on the potential for action rather than the anti-competitive effects of the action. 
This fault in the Queensland Wire test has ramifications for intellectual property licensing 
which are discussed below. 
There is some debate whether the High Court intended the Queensland Wire test to be 
exclusive for "use". In Natwest Australia Bank Ltd v Baral Gerrard Strapping Systems 
Pty Ltd the court states that: 243 
There must be a causal connection between the conduct alleged and the market 
power pleaded such that is can be said that the conduct is a use of that power. In 
many cases the connection may be demonstrated by showing a reliance by the 
contravener upon its market power to insulate it from the sanctions that 
competition would ordinarily visit upon its conduct. 
If the court in Natwest Australia Bank was correct that the Queensland Wire test is only 
one possible test for "use", then what other tests may be applied? 
2 "Use" in Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd 
In Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd244 Geotherm wished to enter into 
the recently deregulated market for electricity production. Geotherm needed various 
planning and resource consents as well as access to various properties and Crown 
resources. Geotherm argued that Electricorp had breached section 36 by embarking upon 
a deliberate policy of excluding all competitors from the electricity production market,245 
and that to this end Electricorp had issued public statements calculated to deter customers 
and financiers from dealing with Geotherm, had entered into exclusionary and exclusive 
dealing contracts to Geotherm's disadvantage, had made repre entations resulting in the 
243Natwest Australia Bank, above n 238, 40,644 (emphasis added). 
244 Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd [ 1992] 2 NZLR 641 . 
245Geotherm, above n 244, 647 . 
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exclusion of Geotherm from Crown land, and had "resisted at every stage on all possible 
grounds, many of them baseless, statutory applications required to be made by 
[Geotherm]" .246 The issue was whether Electricorp has used its dominant position by 
engaging in such conduct. With respect to Electricorp's public statements Gault J noted: 247 
Such statements may be said to "use" a dominant position if it is the dominant 
position that gives the statements the force amounting to deterrence. 
As any firm regardless of market power could issue public statements, this test is an 
acknowledgment that the test for "use" should not be limited to the test propounded in 
Queensland Wire - that is, was the conduct only possible because of dominance. Gault J 
emphasised that the "conduct in question must be considered in its commercial 
context" .248 Gault J's more flexible approach to "use" is emphasised in Clear 
Communications Ltd v Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd. This case concerned the price Telecom 
was able to charge for providing Clear with access to its domestic calls network, in 
particular whether Telecom could include in the price the opportunity cost of permitting 
Clear to have access. In deciding that a price above a fair commercial rate of return would 
breach section 36 Gault J discussed "use":249 
It is perhaps timely to caution against substituting a test helpful in applying the 
statutory rule for the rule itself. To focus upon what the firm in que tion ... might 
do in a fully competitive situation ... may merely complicate rather than solve the 
problem. It attracts the construction of theoretical economic models the material 
characteristics of which may give rise to differences of opinion among even the 
most expert economists. In circumstances where there is an absence of empirical 
evidence there will inevitably be elements of speculation. That, of cour e, is not to 
decry the importance of relevant economic principles but they must be employed to 
246Geotherm, above n 244, 644. 
247Geotherm, above n 244, 650. Gault J also held that these comments were applicable to Electricorp's 
letters to the Crown attempting to foreclose access to Crown resources. See Geotherm, 653. 
248Geotherm, above n 244, 649. 
249Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd ( 1993) 4 TCLR 413, 430. 
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aid the application of the statute to proved commercial circumstances not to 
supplant the process. In cases involving direct dealings with, or refusals to deal by, 
a firm alleged to be dominant in a market by the ownership or control of facilities 
without access to which others cannot enter it may be helpful in determining 
whether there has been a use of a dominant position merely to consider whether the 
firm has acted reasonably or without justification. 
75 
Gault J's approach makes it clear that "use" should not be restricted to a particular test 
that may only be appropriate in certain situations. While the Queensland Wire test was 
sufficient for the cases in which it was employed, it should not restrict the development of 
other tests in situations that obviously amount to a use of dominance. However Clear 
Communications has since been appealed to the Privy Council which applied a test similar 
to that in Queensland Wire, but with the effect of permitting some types of conduct that 
may otherwise have fallen within the test for "use" .250 
In their Lordships' view it cannot be said that a person in a dominant position 
"uses" that position for the purposes of section 36 [if] he acts in a way which a 
person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same circumstances would 
have acted. 
Hence to determine if dominance was "used" this test, like Queensland Wire , looks to 
whether the conduct is possible only because of dominance (rather than considering 
whether dominance is "used" because of anti-competitive effects that could only result 
from a dominant firm's actions). However, rather than stating, as the Court in Queensland 
Wire did, that if a non-dominant firm could not have acted in that manner then dominance 
has been "used", the Privy Council has framed the test in the negative stating that 
dominance cannot have been "used" if a non-dominant firm could have acted in the same 
way.251 While the Privy Council did not comment on whether this test was to be exclusive, 
250Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd Unreported, 19 October 1994, 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council , 22. The word "if' has been substituted for the Privy Council 's 
use of the word "unless". Clearly the Privy Council's unaltered test is a writing error as such a test makes 
no sense at all. While a variety of alterations might make the test workable, the writer has assumed that 
the Privy Council meant "if' . 
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the test has the effect of exempting from Commerce Act scrutiny any conduct which can 
be performed by a non-dominant firm, regardless of whether only a dominant firm's action 
would produce anti-competitive effects. This effect did not result from Queensland Wire. 
3 Implications of the different tests for "use" in refusal to license cases 
The importance of the test for "use" in refusal to license cases rests upon the fact that 
there may be legitimate and illegitimate reasons for refusals to license. The narrow 
approach to use in Queensland Wire and Clear Communications means that section 36 is 
unlikely to be breached by a dominant firm's refusal to license.252 This is simply because 
intellectual property rights are inherently exclusive and maintaining this exclusivity in 
licensing may be the best means of effectively exploiting the right253 regardless of the 
firm's size. Asking whether the firm could refuse to license without dominance would be 
futile. Consider the exploitation of a popular music record. The record will be licensed to 
one manufacturer and distributor. This permits effective promotion as there are no 
competing licensees to "free-ride" on the efforts of other promoters. Hence a non-
dominant firm is as likely as a dominant firm to refuse to license in some situations. Under 
the test in Clear Communications, if a non-dominant firm could do it then it cannot be 
"use" of a dominant position. 
Dominant firms gaining collateral advantages from that dominance should not be able to 
hide behind the general policy arguments relating to the ease of exploitation that apply to 
exclusive licensing for all firms. In such a situation it may be necessary to employ a 
broader test for "use" as suggested in Geotherm. 254 If the firm's dominance lends the anti-
251 The writer is indebted to Y van Roy for this observation. 
252See Gault on Commercial Law, above n 222, CA36.08 pl49. 
25 3See text above at Part XII A. 
254Geotherm, above n 244, 650. 
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competitive force to the conduct (ie the gaining of collateral advantages at the consumer's 
expense) then arguably dominance has been used. 
If the Clear Communications interpretation of "use" must be accepted, the following 
"gangland lawyer" argument may bring refusals to license within section 36: While a firm 
of any size may license to a single manufacturer, only a firm with dominance could afford 
to license to a single inefficient manufacturer and gain second monopoly profits thereby 
because, if the firm was not dominant, market share would suffer through excessive price 
or poor product quality. The difficulty with applying this argument in New Zealand is that 
firms with substantial market power do not reach the section 36 threshold as they would in 
Australia where the threshold is one of market power rather than dominance. Therefore 
the argument cannot work if a firm with substantial market power could also afford to 
license to an inefficient manufacturer. 255 
C "Purpose" 
For section 36 to be breached the licensor must have acted with one of the proscribed 
purposes in section 36(1)(a)-(c). These purposes are restricting market entry, hindering 
competitive conduct in a market, or eliminating a competitor from a market. The first of 
these purposes will be most applicable in refusal to license cases. "Purpose", rather than 
"use", is really the heart of section 36 as "purpose" supplies the pejorative element. As 
Gault J noted in Geotherm, the "distinction between vigorous legitimate competition by a 
corporation with substantial market power and conduct that contravenes the section is in 
the purpose of the conduct". 256 
255 "Substantial market power" implies that some substitutes exist, and it may be impossible for a firm 
with such market power to license to very inefficient manufacturers, especially if product quality suffers. 
256Geotherm, above n 244, 649. 
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The anti-competitive reasons an intellectual property rights holder may have for refusing 
to license have already been discussed above,257 and prima facie a refusal to license where 
no substitutes for the licensed products exist manifests the purpose of restricting market 
entry. Gault J's words in Clear Communications, where Telecom was reluctant to permit 
access to the essential facility of networks for domestic phone calls, have some relevance 
here: 258 
In circumstances... where a competitor realistically cannot enter the market 
without access to the facilities of a firm in a dominant position, a separate 
investigation of the purpose of the behaviour is hardly necessary. The 
anticompetitive purpose is to be inferred from the inevitability of the consequences 
of refusing to deal except on terms that lead to competitive disadvantage ... it is 
necessary to bear in mind s2(5)(b) which provides that so long as it is a substantial 
purpose it is sufficient if it is included in the purposes of the conduct. 
As mentioned however, the licensor will argue that a refusal to license was for the purpose 
of efficient exploitation of the intellectual property right and was entirely independent of 
any anti-competitive intentions. In this situation the court will have to evaluate the relative 
importance of the two interests. Section 2(5)(a)(ii) deems conduct to have had a particular 
"purpose" if "[t]hat purpose was a substantial purpose".259 Therefore to fall within section 
36, the intention to gain collateral advantages by refusing to license need only be one of 
the licensor's purposes, as long as it is a substantial purpose. 260 The purpose must also be 
actively pursued rather than arising purely as a consequence of other action (such as 
marketing strategies).261 Therefore if the efficiency arguments above cannot justify a 
257See text at Part XII B. 
258Ctear Communications v Telecom (CA) ( 1993) 3 TCLR 413, 437. 
259Section 2(1 A) in turn defines "substantial" as "real or of substance". 
260See Union Shipping , above n 242, 710. "The subsidiary purpose, deliberately pursued and desired , to 
inhibit the use by others of non PNL plant and manpower, thus facilitating greater PNL plant utilisation ... 
is an aim, and thus a purpose, deliberately pursued in its own right". 
261 Union Shipping, above n 242, 707, quoting Donald & Heydon Trade Practices Law (1989), 2621. 
"Intention to do an act, which it is known will have anti-competitive consequences, in itself is not enough. 
'Purpose' implies object or aim. The requirement is that 'the conduct producing the consequences was 
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refusal to license on their own, and the intellectual property rights holder is benefiting 
from collateral advantages gained by monopolising further markets and obtaining 
monopoly profits on the manufacture of the product, it would be reasonable to infer that 
the motivation for the refusal to license is not purely to safeguard the intellectual property 
right exploitation but also includes the desire to gain the collateral advantages. Hence it is 
likely that an anti-competitive "purpose", such as deterring competition in a market, exists. 
D Are the Courts Likely to Include Refusals to License Within the Ambit of Section 
36( 1)? 
Ignoring for the moment the technicalities of "use" and "purpose", are the courts likely to 
include refusals to license within the ambit of section 36? In principle intellectual property 
should not be treated differently from tangible property under competition law. Intellectual 
property law disrupts competition only to the extent necessary to create a property right 
that maintains the incentive to innovate. Once the property right exists, it is subject to the 
same competition laws as tangible property. This Part examines the existing case law on 
compulsory licensing, considers whether compulsory licensing will actually provide any 
economic benefits, compares the positions of copyright collection ocieties and patent 
holders, and assesses significance of the proposed amendments to the remedies available 
under the Commerce Act. 
l Precedent on refusals to license 
In Queensland Wire a refusal to supply tangible goods ("Y-Bars" for fencing) constituted 
the breach of the Australian equivalent of section 36.262 The defendant was ordered to 
motivated or inspired by a wish for the occurrence of the consequences'". See also Eastern Express Pty Ltd 
v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1991) 13 ATPR 52,876, 52,896 and van Roy in Gault on Commercial 
Law, above n 222, CA36.09, 3-152. 
262Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act. The s 46 threshold is lower than in New Zealand requiring only 
market power rather than market dominance. 
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supply the goods to a competitor at a reasonable price. The incentive to produce the Y-
Bars was not destroyed as the competitor had to pay the market price for the goods, but 
the monopolisation of secondary markets was restrained. Refusals to license are 
analogous. If a compulsory licensing order is given then royalties must be paid. The 
incentive to innovate is not compromised, but the monopolisation of a secondary market is 
restrained. 
Several European Community cases have dealt with refusal to license situations. In A B 
Volvo v Erik Veng Volvo refused to license the design rights in car body panels.263 The 
European Court of Justice held that an obligation to license rights to third parties, even in 
return for a reasonable royalty, would deprive the rights holder of the substance of the 
exclusive right and that "a refusal to grant [a license] cannot in itself constitute an abuse of 
a dominant position" .264 However the Court then noted that the exercise of an exclusive 
right may constitute use of a dominant position if it involves265 
certain abusive conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent 
repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to 
produce spare parts for a particular model ... 
263A B Volvo, above n 220. 
264A B Volvo, above n 220, 6235. The European Community equivalent of section 36 is article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome. Article 86 provides that: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market in so far as it may affect trade between member states. Such abuse, in particular, 
may consist in : 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transaction with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature, or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract . 
265A B Volvo, above n 220, 6235. 
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The Court however stopped short of actually suggesting that the refusal itself amounted to 
an abuse of dominance as the exercise of an intellectual property right within the subject 
matter of the right is not subject to article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. In other words, the 
rights holder's freedom to license is within the scope of the intellectual property right.266 
With respect though the distinction is nice as it is difficult to see how the Court can then 
claim jurisdiction over the prices charged by the rights holder - a matter which arguably is 
more central to the rights holder's interests.267 
The Magill litigation has taken article 86 a step further. 268 These cases concerned 
television program information that was protected by copyright. The three defendant 
television companies each separately published weekly program guides in their own 
magazines. The three companies sent the weekly listings to newspapers ahead of time but 
permitted only daily publication. There was no single source of weekly information for all 
three companies. Magill, without a license, published such a magazine. Magill argued that 
266For a discussion of A B Volvo and the subsequent cases that followed it see V Korah "No Duty to 
License Independent Repairers to Make Spare Parts: The Renault, Volvo and Bayer & Hennecke Cases" 
[1988] 12 European Intellectual Property Review 381. Also see Korah "Do's and Don'ts for Technology 
Licensing Into the European Community" (l 991) 2 Intellectual Property Journal 3, 23 . 
267See Korah above n 266, 382 for discussion of the "unfair prices" issue. Korah was "concerned by the 
very concept of unfair prices in the absence of a competitive market. Industrial property rights are granted 
in order to enable the person paying for innovation to appropriate the benefits of his investment. Clearly, 
unfair prices appear as one of the examples of abusive exploitation in Article 86 and in several cases 
where the [Community] Court did not have to decide what level of prices would be fair , the Court has 
again confirmed that charging inequitable prices is abusive. It is , however, impossible to determine what 
prices are fair in the absence of a competitive market, and I had hoped that the Court might have given 
less emphasis to this concept now that is has extended the Article to prohibit anticompetitive abuses" . 
Hence the present writer argues that the licensor should be free to set any (non-discriminatory) licensing 
fee provided the licensor can be compelled to license to more efficient manufacturers . 
268RTE v Commission [ 1991] ECR 11-485, BBC v Commission [ 1991] ECR 11-535, and ITP v Commission 
[1991] ECR 11-575. 
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the television companies had abused their dominant position by refusing to grant a license. 
The trial court held that269 
the copyright is no longer exercised in a manner which corresponds to its essential 
function ... which is to protect the moral right in the work and ensure a reward for creative 
effort. 
The copyright was used to monopolise the "derivative market of weekly television 
guides" .270 Excluding all competition "in order to secure the applicant's monopoly" went 
beyond the essential functions of copyright law.271 In substance this decision abandons the 
distinction made in A B Volvo. 272 
The Australian case of ASX Operations v Pont Data concerned a refusal to license stock 
exchange information.273 By statute ASX had a monopoly on operating stock exchanges in 
Australia.274 ASXO was a wholly owned subsidiary of ASX and carried on business 
collating and supplying stock exchange trading information. ASXO retailed this 
information ("Signal C") through its JECNET service. ASXO also supplied Signal C to 
Pont Data, itself a retailer of stock exchange information and in competition with the 
JECNET service. New contracts were negotiated on terms to which Pont Data objected, 
essentially because the terms were designed to place Pont Data at a commercial 
269Rec. 71. 
270Radio Tele/is Eireann v EC Commission (Magill TV Guide Limited intervening) [199 l] 4 CMLR 586. 
271 RTE, above n 270, 618. 
272See text above at n 264. For this reason the decision is controversial and may be overturned. See G van 
der Wal "Article 86 EC: The Limits of Compulsory Licensing" (1994) 4 European Competition Law 
Review 230. 
273ASX Operations Pty Limited & Anor v Pont Data Australia Pty Limited ( 199 I) 13 A TPR 9[ 41-069. 
274ASX, above n 273, 52,050. The Securities Industry Act 1980 as amended by the Australian Stock 
Exchange and National Guarantee Fund Act 1980 prohibits the creation of competing stock markets. ASX 
may also have had a valid copyright in the data resulting from the particular format in which the data was 
arranged. As new data had to be supplied each day however, and as only ASX had access to this data, 
ASX did not need to rely on any intellectual property right to maintain exclusivity. Purchasers of the data 
that did not abide by the contractual conditions of use could be cut off from future supply. 
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disadvantage vis-a-vis its competitor JECNET.275 At trial Wilcox J held that section 46 of 
the Trade Practices Act had been breached and that it would be appropriate to order 
variation of the contract to comply with the Act. The difficulties setting a pricing structure 
for compulsory licensing invited comparison with the order for compulsory supply m 
Queensland Wire: 276 
If ASXO operated in a competitive market, in the supply of Signal "C", guidance 
would be available as to a fair price for the signal. One could look at the price 
charged by ASXO's competitors. But there are no competitors and, as I have held, 
the fees charged by ASXO are a function of its monopolistic position and its 
misuse of market power... After its remission by the High Court, Queensland Wire 
was settled [by the parties]. Pincus J. was therefore relieved of the duty of 
determining what was a fair price at which to compel BHP to supply Y-bar to 
Queensland Wire. Had his Honour been required to undertake this task he would, 
no doubt, have considered evidence as to the cost of producing Y-bar and as to the 
profit margin normally obtained by manufacturers of steel products ... Although the 
nature of the product [in that case] is very different, I think that the same comment 
applies in the present case. Once it is accepted that ASXO is not entitled to misuse 
its monopoly position, it ought not to be regarded as unfair to compel ASXO to 
supply Signal "C" at a price which reflects the cost of supplying that signal 
together with a margin of profit similar to that charged by competitive uppliers in 
the data industry... In a competitive situation [the low cost of collating and 
supplying signal "C"] would be reflected in a low price [to Pont Data]. 
Implicit in Wilcox J's judgment is recognition that ASX is entitled to a fair commercial 
return on the commodity supplied, but that it is not entitled to price in a discriminatory 
275There were five main complaints. (i) The contract required Pont Data to supply commercially sensitive 
client information to ASX, allegedly for royalty "monitoring" purposes. (ii ) Terms of the contract 
described Pont Data as a "carrier" of information when in fact Pont Data manipulated the information to 
provide format suitable for its clients. The contract thus implied that ASXO's (cheaper) retail information 
service was the same as Pont Data's. Pont Data was required by the contract to present to it's clients an 
agreement representing it as a "carrier" of the information. (iii) The contract prohibited Pont Data from 
"wholesaling" the information (ie selling it on to another supplier). (iv) The fee structure discriminated 
against Pont Data by charging a "storage" fee because Pont Data supplied historical information to its 
customers in addition to the "real-time" information supplied . (v) Pont Data claimed that the fee levels 
were too high and were aimed at subsidising ASXO's own retail service, JECNET. 
276 Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd v ASX Operations Pty Ltd & A nor ( 1990) I 2 A TPR ~[ 4 I -007, 51, 132. 
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fashion to deter competition in a secondary market. 277 The argument is applicable to 
intellectual property that has an innovative component. The rights holder is entitled to a 
fair commercial return on the innovation, which would reflect the development costs, but 
is not entitled to use monopoly power to prevent competition with its subsidiary in the 
market for manufacture. 
2 The counter-argument: Will compulsory licensing actually restrain abuses of 
dominance and reduce the anti-competitive effects of market power? 
One significant counter-argument exists to the "refusal to license - collateral advantage" 
theory expounded above.278 In Queensland Wire BHP was ordered to supply the Y-bar at 
a reasonable price (ie one that would exist in a competitive situation). What will be a 
reasonable price for the products of innovation? For intellectual property law to function, 
monopoly profits must be obtainable on the innovation itself. The intellectual property 
rights holder is free to license at whatever price is deemed to be most effective for 
recovering the fixed costs. As the marginal cost of intellectual property goods is low, such 
pricing strategies will usually involve restriction on output to maintain high returns. If it is 
accepted that monopoly profits should be reflected in a licensing fee,279 what then is the 
difference between 1) the charging of high licensing fees to non-exclusive licensees and 2) 
the charging of moderate license fees to a subsidiary which makes additional monopoly 
profits in the secondary market of manufacture? Either way the licensor makes the same 
profit and the consumer pays the same price. The licensor cannot be ordered to make 
277The Full Federal Court upheld Wilcox J's decision in respect of s 46(1 )(c) - that ASXO had deterred 
competitive conduct in the retail information market. See ASX, above n 273, 52,068-52,069 and 52,071 . 
278See text above at Part XII B. 
279Note that this proposition is itself challengeable. Intellectual property rights permit price to be raised 
above marginal cost, but only need to allow enough profits to maintain the incentive to innovate. 
"Monopoly" profits may be above the level of profit needed to sustain innovation, particularly given that 
the lower the marginal cost, the less the repeated exploitation exhausts the product. See OECD, above n 
23, 12. Article 86(a) of the Treaty of Rome, above n _, appears to permit judicial intervention when the 
profit is "unfairly" high. 
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lower profits as this strikes at the heart of the incentive structure of intellectual property 
law. 
In response to this argument, compulsory licensing can be justified in two ways. First, the 
argument above is too neat. Licensing to an inefficient subsidiary shielded from 
competition may permit rights holders to justify excessive product cost to the consumer on 
the basis of production costs rather than innovative investment. The innovative 
investment may be minimal and therefore much of the profits gained are social deadweight 
losses. The losses are obscured by the vertical integration. Naked profiteering from 
intellectual property right exploitation may attract the attention of law reformers280 or 
regulatory bodies.281 Compulsory licensing would limit the exercise of intellectual property 
rights by firms with market dominance to remuneration commensurate with the costs of 
innovation. 
Secondly, profiteering may attract judicial attention. European courts consider it within 
their power to restrain excessive profits under equivalents of section 36.282 
Thirdly, the arguments raised in Jefferson Parish Hospital are applicable. While refusals to 
license may not affect the ultimate price or quality of the goods that reach the consumer, 
refusals to license permit the rights holder to monopolise secondary markets with 
potentially long term detrimental effects. These secondary markets can be either different 
functional or different product markets as explained above. Even the relatively Chicago-
school orientated judgment of O'Conner J acknowledged this effect as detrimental. Section 
280vertical integration in the pharmaceutical industry may obscure the nature of profits derived. It would 
be difficult to achieve legislative action to extend the patent term to 20 years if compulsory licensing had 
exposed the attainment of excessive profits from innovative activity. 
281 Toe Copyright Tribunal is one example of a regulatory body with powers to adjust license fees. See Part 
V of the Copyright Act 
282See van der Wal, above n 272. Note that the Privy Council in Clear Communications considered 
monopoly pricing for access to essential facilitie acceptable under the Commerce Act. If price control is 
required then Part IV of the Act should be used (see Clear Communications, above n 250, 28). 
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36 itself supports this conclusion as the proscribed purposes are couched in terms of 
preserving a competitive commercial environment for long te'~ economic efficiency - In 
other words, using a dominant position for monopolising markets is undesirable in itself. If 
this was the dominant firm's purpose, then compulsory licensing is justified irrespective of 
whether this would affect the dominant firm's profits. 
3 Copyright collection societies 
The Department of Justice considered the activities of copyright collection societies in 
"The Copyright Act 1962 - Options for Reform" .283 The department noted the lack of 
regulation for such bodies and the consequent potential for abuse of monopoly powers,284 
especially when collection societies arrange reciprocal agreements between themselves. 
Although the Department was most concerned with the effects of monopoly on the 
authors of copyright works, the Report mentioned the potential effects on copyright users, 
quoting from the November 1988 Monthly Review of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIP0): 285 
A concentration of authors' rights in the hand of one collecting society can lead to 
a degree of power that brings certain danger with it... [A] collecting society can 
exploit its monopoly by demanding excessive remuneration from users ... or even 
by refusing altogether to grant licenses. 
The Report recommended legislative regulation of collection societies, but the Copyright 
Bill 1994 does not address these concerns. So far as copyright users are concerned it 
would seem that the Commerce Act already offers some protection. 
283Department of Justice The Copyright Act 1962 - Options for Ref orm (Department of Justice, 
Wellington, l 989). 
284Department of Justice, above n 283, 24. 
285Department of Justice, above n 283, 24-25 . 
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The issue of refusals to license arose in the context of Australian Performing Right 
Association Ltd v Ceridale Pty Ltd.286 The collection society for the performance of 
musical works, APRA, sought payment from Ceridale (a nightclub) of overdue license 
fees. When Ceridale refused to pay, APRA cancelled Ceridale's licenses and sought 
injunctions to prohibit further performance of music by Ceridale. Ceridale alleged that 
APRA was using its market power to restrain competition in a secondary market in order 
to enforce a disputed debt. The Court held that APRA possessed sufficient market power 
but that APRA did not have the requisite purpose. This case suggests however that a 
refusal to license action is possible against collection societies. 287 
4 Patent vs copyright - Can a distinction in principle be made? 
In theory, refusals to license to obtain monopoly profits on manufacture go beyond the 
protection offered by intellectual property rights. The incentive to create is not jeopardised 
as the licensor can charge monopoly prices for the license. As long as the license pricing is 
not discriminatory (eg vis-a-vis the license fees charged to a subsidiary) the licensor 
cannot recover monopoly prices for manufacture. Intellectual property rights holders are 
unlikely to greet this proposition with enthusiasm however. Many vertically integrated 
firms are likely to view the exclusive right to manufacture as a legitimate incident of the 
intellectual property right. This is especially true of patent holders. The issue therefore is 
whether intellectual property law envisages licensing exclusivity as an integral part of the 
right and essential for maintaining the incentive to create.288 It has been argued that 
286Australian Performing Right Association Ltd v Ceridale Pty Ltd (199 I) A TPR 4 I ,074. See P Armitage 
"Regulating the Terms of Supply - When can Copyright Owners Refuse to License?" ( 1993) 3 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 91. 
287See M Ryan "Copyright and Competition Policy - ConOict or Peaceful Co-existence?" (l 99 I) 2 
Intellectual Property Journal 206, 2 I 8 for a contrary view. 
288Undoubtedly this second monopoly would aid creator's, but is it essential for creativity to proceed? As 
mentioned above the limited nature of intellectual property rights is aimed at providing only enough 
protection to encourage creativity. 
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copyright law does not envisage this right,289 so can a distinction be made in principle for 
patent law? 
At first glance actions for refusals to license seem more "acceptable" for copyright than 
patent. This is probably because the copyright industries are traditionally less vertically 
integrated, and the nature of copyright exploitation is different. Collection societies may 
be subject to section 36 for refusals to license. Market dominance is uncontested in these 
cases, but where a patent is deemed to create market dominance, there is no reason in 
principle why it should be treated differently. 
Given the market structure of patent exploitation it is po sible that compulsory licensing 
will deter firms from innovation, or at least act as a deterrence to using the patent system. 
Innovators may prefer to keep innovations secret and rely on breach of confidence actions, 
rather than patent law, for protection.290 Thus compulsory patent licensing may frustrate 
one of patent law's primary objectives - diffusion of knowledge. Furthermore, innovations 
not subject to patent law will never fall into the public domain on the expiry of the patent 
protection term, and can therefore be monopolised indefinitely. 
5 Section 89 of the Commerce Act 1986 
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that compulsory licensing for breach of section 36 is 
envisaged is the proposed amendments to the Patents Act and Commerce Act as part of 
the GATT reforms. Clause 20 of the GATT (Uruguay Round) Bill 1994 amends section 
89 of the Commerce Act by permitting the court to grant compulsory patent licen es as 
part of the general remedies available to a court under section 89 for breaches of Part II of 
Z89See text above at Part XIII D 3. 
290See FM Scherer Innovation and Growth (MIT, I 984). Scherer found that compulsory licensing in the 
United States did not affect the level of investment in research and development, but that it did affect the 
levels of patenting activity, especially for those firms that had been subject to compulsory licensing orders. 
See OECD, above 23, 13. 
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the Commerce Act. 291 The terms of clause 20 go beyond permitting orders for mere 
variations of licenses (which might be necessary where collateral advantages are gained in 
licensing agreements), but instead extend to granting entirely new licenses. The rationale 
for this power cannot lie in the failure to adequately exploit a patent,292 or in the inclusion 
of terms that would be void under section 66 of the Patents Act, as these actions are 
subject to scrutiny under the Patents Act and not the Commerce Act. The compulsory 
license remedy is thus available for breach of the Commerce Act, and the most logical 
explanation for this power to grant new, non-exclusive, licenses is when an intellectual 
property rights holder with market dominance has refused to license for one of the 
purposes proscribed in section 36. 
An argument can be made however that the amendments to section 89 result from the 
proposed repeal of section 47 of the Patents Act and therefore that section 89 is not 
intended to permit compulsory licensing. As mentioned above,293 section 47 permits 
compulsory licensing where the trade in materials not the subject of the patent is unfairly 
prejudiced by licensing terms imposed by the licensor. Article 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
agreement permits such provisions in patent acts to be repealed if adequate protection 
exists in domestic competition laws. This would suggest that the purpose of the section 89 
amendments is to provide remedies in cases of licensing agreements directed at gaining 
291Clause 20 of the Bill amends the Commerce Act by inserting the following subsection after subsection 
I of section 89: 
(JA) Without limiting the orders that may be made under subsection ( 1) of this section, an order 
may be made under that subsection that a patentee (as defined in section 2( 1) of the Patents Act 
1953) grant a license to use a patented invention in respect of which that patentee is the grantee 
or proprietor of the relevant patent. 
(IB) Any order referred to in subsection IA of this section may be made on such terms and 
conditions as the Court thinks fit. 
( 1 C) Any license granted pursuant to an order referred to in subsection (IA) of this section-
(a) Is not exclusive: 
(b) Must not be assigned otherwise than in connection with the goodwill of the business in which 
the patented invention is used: 
(c) Is limited to the supply of the patented invention predominantly in New Zealand. 
292See s46 of the Patents Act. 
293See the text at Part IX B. 
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collateral advantages, and thus replace section 47. The difficulty with this explanation is 
that Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS agreement states that compulsory licensing is only 
permissible where the proposed user has "made efforts to obtain authorization from the 
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not 
been successful...". This leads back to the conclusion that section 89 permits compulsory 
licensing in "refusal to license" situations, rather than "oppressive" licensing situations, and 
therefore as a consequence, that a refusal to license can breach section 36.294 
XV SECTION 36(2) OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
Section 36(2) provides that: 
For the purposes of [section 36(1)], a person does not use a dominant position in a market 
for any of the purposes specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection ( 1) of this section 
by reason only that that person seeks to enforce any statutory intellectual property right 
within the meaning of section 45(2) of this Act in New Zealand. 
Section 36(2) presents three issues. First, while "enforce" undoubtedly applies to legal 
action in the courts, does it also apply to refusals to license? Secondly, do the words "by 
reason only" exclude from the exemption the "enforcement" of statutory intellectual 
property rights for collateral advantages. Thirdly, if a particular instance of judicial action 
fro intellectual property rights enforcement does not fall within the section 36(2) 
exemption, what is the significance of the Australian case law on the "use" of an 
intellectual property right, and also the New Zealand case law on the "use" of legal right ? 
294At the time of writing it appears that 1he amendments to section 89 will not now proceed . Some 
submissions on the GA TT Bill were concerned that compulsory licenses may be granted as a remedy for 
any breaches of Part II of the Commerce Act, whether intellectual property licensing was involved or not. 
For example, Fisher & Paykel was concerned that its "Smart Drive" technology could be licensed as a 
sanction for price fixing! These concerns seem a little extreme, as there are many other equally 
inappropriate sanctions a court could impose under the Commerce Act. In any case there is arguably the 
scope under section 89 as it stands to grant compulsory licenses. (Telephone discussion with Ministry of 
Commerce, November 23, 1994). 
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These issues are dealt with as they arise in the context of refusals to license and legal 
actions. 
A The Application of Section 36(2) to Refusals to License 
A Department of Trade and Industry paper on the Commerce Bill 1985 suggests that the 
purpose of clause 36(2) was to exempt the legitimate enforcement of legal rights in the 
courts from the Commerce Act.295 The submissions to the Select Committee considering 
the clause 36 of the Commerce Bill did not raise concerns about refusals to license being 
subject to the Commerce Act.296 This is more contentious, the only two academic 
commentators to address this issue disagreed. Eagles argues that a "person does not 
enforce or seek to enforce a right by doing nothing".297 A refusal to license, being only 
passive conduct, does not fall within the exemption. Calhoun argues that subjecting a 
simple refusal to license to the Commerce Act would undermine the exclusivity that 
intellectual property rights confer, and hence section 36(2) should apply to refusals to 
license.298 It may be that given the presence of the words "by reason only" in section 36(2) 
that both of these arguments are academic.299 
1 "Seeking to Enforce" 
Other things being equal, competition law should allow a rights holder to maintain the 
exclusivity that the right confers as an incentive to create. While court action to restrain 
295Department of Trade and Industry paper Commerce Bill: Intellectual Property Rights addressed to the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Commerce and Marketing, 5. 
296Some submissions however were concerned that an intellectual property "monopoly" create a dominant 
position. The Department of Trade and Industry considered that thi s concern arose from a misconception 
about the difference between "property" monopolies and economic monopolies. See Paper, above n 295, 5. 
297Eagles, above n 17, 55. 
298Calhoun, above n 97, 15. 
299See text below at Part XIV A 2. 
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infringement is clearly within the section 36(2)'s ambit, refusals to license are also directed 
at maintaining exclusivity. It is arguable that "seeking to enforce" should also include 
refusals to license because maintaining exclusivity by either means causes the same 
economic impact:300 
[I]t would not be too strained an interpretation to say that in declining to give a 
licence, and in so doing reiterating his exclusive rights, a right holder would be 
doing no more than seeking to enforce (in the sense of compelling observance of) 
his rights. 
However the absence of any exemption in the Trade Practices Act for section 46 seems to 
suggest that section 36(2) may have been only an afterthought intended to protect judicial 
action from attack. 
2 "By reason only" 
Whether "seeking to enforce" includes refusals to license may be academic because the 
words "by reason only" mean that refusals to license in order gain collateral advantages 
will not be exempted. When a rights holder refuses to license to a competitor, or will 
license only on onerous terms, and the rights holder can adduce no evidence of marketing 
constraints, then there will be good ground for inferring that the rights holder's motives go 
beyond the purpose of gaining monopoly profits on the innovation itself and instead 
extend to the monopolisation of secondary market . A refusal to license in such 
circumstances could not be said to be "by reason only" of a desire to maintain exclusivity. 
If no collateral advantage is sought then it is unlikely that section 36( 1) would be breached 
by a refusal to license in any case (irrespective of whether section 36(2) applies to refusals 
to license), as the requisite purpose would be ab ent. 
300Calhoun, above n 97, 15. 
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B The Application of Section 36(2) to Litigation for Infringement of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
93 
Because intellectual property can not be possessed, appropriation is easy. 30 1 Litigation for 
infringement of intellectual property rights is therefore more likely than for tangible 
property. Section 36(2) functions to protect rights holders from breach of section 36(1) 
claims by reason only that intellectual property rights are enforced in court. A section 
36(1) claim may allege that the rights holder is deterring competition by imposing 
unnecessary legal costs and adverse court decisions302 on the competitor. In the United 
States this is known as "sham litigation". 
In Geotherm Gault J stated that "it is difficult to suppose that a contravention of [section 
36(1)] will be established by the mere reasonable rights of objection ... ".303 The inference is 
that some types of legal action, when brought for a proscribed purpose, may breach 
section 36. In Geotherm the defendant claimed that Electricorp had embarked upon a 
policy to exclude competitors which included the exercise of legal rights that imposed 
costs upon the prospective market entrant. 304 Such conduct may involve the use of a 
dominant position but more importantly would be acting for a proscribed purpose. If this 
was the case, the firm could not argue it was seeking only to enforce a statutory 
intellectual property right. 
30 1 Appropriation is also facilitated by the hazy boundries of some intellectual property rights. In copyright 
cases, for example, it may be difficult to determine what are the "ideas" and "expressions" in any given 
work. Only the latter are protected. 
302Sham litigation does not just encompass judicial deci ions but includes the decisions of regulatory 
approval boards and members of the executive ann of government. 
303Geotherm, above n 244, 655 . 
304Geotherm, above n 244, 651-652. Geotherm is a classic illustration of many sorts of non-price 
predation. 
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Section 36(2) has been mentioned twice m sham litigation cases. In Electricity 
Corporation v Geotherm Gault J noted that section 36(2) was introduced to permit the 
"reasonable exercise" of legal rights.305 In Telecom v Clear Smellie J noted that a legal 
action for breach of copyright was expressly excluded from the conduct proscribed by 
section 36(1).306 Neither of these judgments specifically focused on the words "by reason 
only". While Smellie J appears to discount them, Gault J's judgment implies that judicial 
actions brought in the context of a policy to exclude competitors are not brought "by 
reason only" of the enforcement of an intellectual property right: 307 
It is difficult to envisage a situation in which there will be a contravention by the 
reasonable exercise of rights of objection. The allegations here, however, are as to 
the manner of exercise of the rights by way of implementation of a policy to 
exclude competitors which incorporates this and other conduct. Whether that 
amounts to use of market dominance will be a matter for evidence. That the 
introduction of s36(2) was considered necessary to exclude the enforcement of the 
statutory intellectual property rights seems consistent with this approach. 
Gault J does not say "what" approach however, and so his decision can be read in two 
ways. First, section 36(2) provides that section 36 is not infringed "by reason only that 
that person seeks to enforce any statutory intellectual property right...". 308 This implies 
that a successful legal claim may be unreasonable if in the context of a "policy to exclude 
competitors" .309 However Gault J may have meant that the exemption is intended to 
permit any valid intellectual property claims regardless of context. The former 
interpretation is preferable as it is more consistent with the actual words of the tatute. 
305Geotherm, above n 244, 652. 
306Telecom v Clear [1992] 3 NZLR 247, 254. 
307 Geotherm, above n 244, 651-652. 
308Section 36(2) of the Commerce Act (emphasis added) . 
309Geotherm, above n 244, 652. Section 36(2) can also carry another meaning. "Enforce" may extend to 
refusals to license. If a monopolist refuses to license for ulterior motives then section 36 may be breached. 
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Nonetheless Australian courts have not had to depend on an exemption such as section 
36(2) to permit the legitimate enforcement of intellectual property rights in court. In two 
cases the Australian courts have held that the enforcement of an intellectual property right 
in the courts is not "taking advantage" of (ie "using") market power but is only the use of 
the intellectual property right. In Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Kenman Developments 
Pty Ltd Kenman complained that Cadbury had "an improper motive in commencing and 
continuing with [legal] proceedings which [Kenman] believes to be untenable, 
unreasonable and doomed to failure". 310 Olney J noted that3 11 
[t]here may well be circumstances in which the unreasonable pursuit of a claimed legal 
right against a less powerful competitor by a corporation with substantial market power 
could amount to taking advantage of that power. .. 
Olney J held that no use of dominance had occurred in this case because the claims were 
not unreasonable (ie not "doomed to failure"). This confuses "use" and "purpose" 
however.312 Whether a legal action is likely to succeed has no bearing on whether it was 
possible to bring the action in the first place. Probability of success will thus be more 
indicative of the plaintiffs purpose in bringing the action, and will not relate to whether 
dominance was used to bring the action. In Wannan International v Envirotech Australia 
Pty Ltd Wilcox J noted that313 
[t]o exercise in good faith an extraneous legal right, though the effect may be to lessen, or 
even eliminate competition, is to take advantage of that right, not market power ... 
310Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Kennzan Developments Pty Ltd (1991) 13 ATPR <j[ _, 52,749. 
31 1Cadbury, above n 310, 52,757. 
3 I 2Toe probability of success may be an evidential factor pointing towards "use" as only firms with market 
power can afford to bring fruitless legal actions. The thre hold in New Zealand fro the application of s36 
is market dominance not market power however, and as many firms below the dominance threshold have 
the resources to sham-litigate, probability of success may be less helpful as an indicator of "use" in New 
Zealand. 
313Warman International v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR para 40-714, 47,827 . Note that 
this case was decided prior to Queensland Wire. 
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The operative words are "good faith" however. Although this comes closer to a test for 
"use", it is again related to "purpose". Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act has no 
equivalent exemption to section 36(2). In seeking to protect the reasonable exercise of 
legal rights from section 46, because no statutory exemption is provided, the Australian 
courts have adopted a strained interpretation of "use". 314 The test does not determine 
whether the legal action was possible because of market power,315 or whether the effects 
of the action were detrimental only because of the firm's market power.316 If the legal 
action is brought reasonably to protect an intellectual property right, then this would 
suggest that the firm's purpose was not to fetter competition, although this may be an 
unavoidable consequence of the action.317 This is a different matter from whether 
dominance was "used". With respect, the Courts in the above cases seem to have been 
reluctant to hold that a dominant position had been "used" because of the mi taken belief 
that to hold there had been a "use" would establish contravention of the section.318 The 
test in the above cases therefore involves the legal fiction that market power has not been 
"used" when the purpose is legitimate. This fiction should be abandoned as it obscures the 
object of section 36 (and section 46 of the Trade Practices Act) which is to punish 
conduct only where a dominance has been used for a proscribed purpose: "Use" is merely 
a causal link. 319 
31 4The Australian analysis has been applied to a degree in New Zealand in respect of the enforcement of 
other legal rights for which there is no Commerce Act exemption such as Fair Trading Act 1986 
complaints. 
315This is the Queensland Wire and Clear Communications te t for "use". 
3l6Tois is the extended test for "use" in Geotherm. 
317See text above at n 261. 
318As the Privy Council stated (correctly) in Clear Communications , above n 250, 20, "[t]he use of a 
dominant position otherwise than for one of those purposes [in section 36( I )(a)-(c)] does not constitute a 
breach". 
3 l 9See text above at n 238. 
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In summary, the words "by reason only" do not exempt the judicial enforcement of 
intellectual property rights from section 36(1) where the legal action is part of an anti-
competitive policy. Furthermore, the Australian cases show that an exemption for judicial 
enforcement is unnecessary for legal actions intending only to enforce the intellectual 
property right. While the Australian cases have mistakenly considered the motivation for 
the enforcement under the element of "use", the same factors can validly be considered 
under "purpose" which will lead to the same result. 
XVI CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the economic rationales for intellectual property law and 
competition law. In spite of the seeming conflicts between the two areas of law, both aim 
to promote economic efficiency, and both areas of the law can be reconciled by adherence 
to two simple principles. First, an intellectual property rights holder is entitled to divide 
and assign the totality of the right granted by intellectual property law in the manner that 
the rights holder considers will best achieve efficient exploitation. Secondly, competition 
law cannot attack the existence of intellectual property rights but will scrutinise the 
conduct of intellectual property rights holders where licensing terms, or refusals to license, 
are aimed at procuring anti-competitive advantages collateral to those permitted by the 
intellectual property right. Applying these principles to the application of section 45 the 
types of licensing provisions that infringe competition law have been identified. 
These principles can also be applied to refusal to license by fllTils with dominant positions 
in markets. A dominant firm may seek to gain collateral advantages by refusing to license 
in order to gain monopoly profits on the manufacture of the intellectual property goods (in 
addition to the monopoly profits in the innovation) or to monopolise the secondary 
functional market or a even secondary product market. Section 36 of the Commerce Act is 
equipped to deal with such situations but the restrictive tests for "use" of a dominant 
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position put forward in Queensland Wire and Clear Communications may frustrate the 
operation of section 36 in this context. 
Section 36(2) of the Commerce Act provides a limited exemption from section 36(1). The 
exemption will permit the enforcement of an intellectual property right in court to be 
exempt from claims of abuse of legal process. The inclusion of the words "by reason only" 
in section 36(2) means that legal actions with collateral motives such as sham litigation 
will not be exempt. It is uncertain whether section 36(2) applies to refusals to license. The 
argument is academic however as the words "by reason only" involve much the same 
criteria as "purpose" under section 36(1): If section 36(2) applies as an exemption in a 
particular instance, then the requirements for "purpose" under section 36(1) would not be 
satisfied. 
Competition Law (LAWS 525) 
APPENDIX A - Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) A TPR <J[ 40-166. 
Arlo were the owners of a patent for a telescopic pole (the "Arlo Pole") used in the 
construction of electric transmission lines. Arlo granted an exclusive license to Transfield 
to make, use, and vend the Arlo pole over the whole of Australia. Transfield paid an up-
front fee and would pay further royalties on its use of the Arlo pole. Transfield was 
already one of the 3 main operators in Australia constructing transmission lines. The Arlo 
pole was found to be unsatisfactory in some situations, mainly due to either design or 
manufacturing faults, and Transfield designed a similar pole for use in these situations. The 
new pole did not infringe the patent of the Arlo pole, but it effectively destroyed the 
market in Australia for the Arlo pole. Arlo sought to restrain Transfield's use of this new 
pole. Transfield contested two clauses in the license. Clause 7 stated that: 
The Licensee [Transfield] covenants during the period of the Power Transmission 
Line License at all times to use its best endeavours in and towards the design 
fabrication installation and selling of the ARLO PTL pole throughout the licensed 
territory and to energetically promote and develop the greatest possible market for 
the ARLO PTY pole. 
The case raised issues in both the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Patents Act 
1952 (Cth). Section 51(1) of the Trade Practices Act is equivalent to our section 45 
exemption of the Commerce Act, although not worded as tightly. Section l 12(l)(a) of the 
Patents Act 1952 (Cth) provides that licensing conditions that restrict the licensee from 
using patented or unpatented articles not supplied by the licensor are void. Section 
112(7)(a) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) provides that section l 12(l)(a) does not affect 
licensing provisions that restrict the licensee from selling goods other than those of the 
licensor. Sections 112(l)(a) and l 12(7)(a) of the Patents Act 1952 are equivalent to 
sections 66(l)(b) and 66(5) of the New Zealand Patents Act 1953 respectively. The case is 
a typical High Court of Australia judgment in so far as all of the judges reach different 
conclusions upon different grounds. 
A best endeavour clause is usually a covert means of implementing an exclusive dealing 
contract prohibiting the licensee from dealing with people other than the licensor. An 
exclusive dealing contract is by its nature anti-competitive and subject to scrutiny. Without 
deciding whether this particular clause would be anti-competitive, Barwick CJ stated that: 1 
The effect of a best endeavour clause is not, in my opinion, to prohibit or restrict 
the promisor from using articles not supplied or owned by the promisee. There is 
nothing in the terms of cl. 7 which, in my opinion, would produce that effect. 
Thus clause 7 did not fall foul of section 112(1) of the Patents Act. Although Transfield 
would not be successful in striking down clause 7, Barwick CJ's interpretation robs it of its 
intended effect. Barwick CJ went on to consider the effect of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 on clause 7. Strictly speaking this was unnecessary given his interpretation of clause 
7, but he nonetheless concluded that the Trade Practices Act provisions would not apply. 
"[l]t is enough to say that sec. 51(1)(a) of [the Trade Practices] Act, by excepting things 
authorised by the Patents Act, provides an answer" .2 This somewhat brief analysis has the 
effect of exempting just about any anti-competitive clause in a licensing agreement from 
competition law scrutiny. It is suggested that Barwick CJ's interpretation is not correct. 
Section 53(l)(a) of the Trade Practices Act provides that in determining whether section 
46 [contracts substantially lessening competition] has been breached regard shall not be 
had, in the case of a license granted by the owner of a patent, to any condition of the 
license relating to the invention to which the patent relates. To read this provision as 
permitting any clause to be included in a patent license would be wrong. It is doubtful 
whether a clause requiring the licensee only to u e the licensed products would be immune 
from the Trade Practices Act. Such a clause would not exclusively relate to the licensed 
article. 
l Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd ( 1980) ATPR <Ji 40-166, 42,303. 
2Transfield, above n l, 42,303 . 
Stephen J's judgment was more detailed. He discussed at length the relationship between 
section 112(1)(a) and section 112(7)(a) of the Patents Act, which are the equivalents of 
section 66(1) and section 66(5) in our Patents Act respectively. Section 112(l)(a) states 
that clauses restricting the use of other articles are void. Section l 12(7)(a) states however 
that nothing in section 112(l)(a) affects a condition which restricts the right of a licensee 
to sell other articles. Stephen J held that clause 7 required Transfield not to sell 
competitors poles, and that this restriction was thus valid. It follows that he viewed the act 
of including poles in the larger manufactured product of whole a transmission line was the 
act of selling rather than just of using. It would be possible however to argue that in thi 
case section 112(7)(a) was intended only to allow restrictions upon licensees selling poles 
wholesale and separately from any other product. Stephen J then went on to consider the 
Trade Practices Act. He declined to address the exemption clause as he did not believe this 
contract to be one that substantially lessens competition in any case. 
Mason J held that clause 7 did not place any restrictions on the licensee's ability to use or 
sell other poles as this was not the clause's purpose or effect. Clause 7 was "susceptible of 
an interpretation which preserves its validity by not bringing it into conflict with sec. 112. 
This is the interpretation which should be given to it".3 Mason J's comments on section 53 
of the Trade Practices Act warrant quotation in full. 4 
I take the view that sec. 51 (3)(a)(i) and sec. 51 (3)(a)(iii) of the Trade Practices 
Act would provide a defence to a case of contravention of sec. 45(2) arising out of 
the presence of cl. 7 in the agreement... [Transfield] submitted that cl. 7 of the 
Agreement does not only relate to "the invention" or to "articles made by the use of 
that invention" but it goes beyond the terms of sec. 51 (3)(a)(iii) and related to 
other products, that is, it relates to not using any other poles. This submission ... 
attributes to the word "relates" a meaning which i too narrow, thereby giving sec. 
5 I (3) an overly restrictive operation. 
3Transfield, above n I, 42,309. 
4Transfield, above n 1, 42,3 10. 
In bridging the different policies of the Patents Act and the Trade Practices Act, 
sec. 51(3) recognizes that a patentee is justly entitled to impose conditions on the 
granting of a licence ... in order to protect the patentee's legal monopoly. Even 
under American antitrust law, where there is no equivalent exception to sec. 51 (3), 
the patentee is entitled to exercise some measure of control over the licensee 
consistent with the scope of the patent monopoly, though there ha been some 
controversy as to the scope of permissible control... 
Section 51(3) determines the scope of restrictions the patentee may properly 
impose on the use of a patent. Conditions which seek to gain advantages 
collateral to the patent are not covered by sec. 51(3) [empha is added]. 
Although strictly obiter, Mason J's comments are the fullest judicial examination of the 
interface between intellectual property law and competition law in either New Zealand or 
Australia. The passage illustrates some of the difficulties that arise by the use of the word 
"relates" in exemption clauses. This word was dropped from Section 45 of the Commerce 
Act here by the 1990 amendment. Because of the use of the word "relates" Mason J was 
required to consider the policy of this legislation. Essentially he adopts the test of 
"collateral advantage". He determined that if clause 7 had required Tran field to use only 
Arlo poles, then this would not be seeking any collateral advantage: Arlo is seeking simply 
to ensure exploitation if their pole. The words "to protect the patentee's legal monopoly" 
appear to be used somewhat loosely though, as technically the legal monopoly relates only 
to the Arlo pole, and not to any other. Implicit in the his judgment therefore is that as a 
practical matter of exploitation such an exclusive dealing clause is permissible, as a hostile 
licensee possessing an exclusive license could deprive the licensor of any remuneration for 
that invention within the area of the exclusive license by simply marketing only competing 
its own poles (ie Transfield's). This would result in removing a competitor from the 
market. If a clause was any wider though, perhaps mandating the purchase of raw 
material or other type of products from nominated persons, then this could be a 
collateral advantage under Mason J's reasoning. The difficulty with Mason J's reasoning is 
that exclusive dealing contracts may not contravene the Trade Practices Act, and therefore 
there is no reason to grant an outright exemption for all exclusive dealing contracts. 
Murphy J dissented from the majority. He did not consider the Trade Practices Act, but 
rather confined his reasoning to the Patents Act.5 
The Patents Act ... provides monopoly rights in respect of inventions and allows the 
monopolist to license others to make the article or use the process invented. In 
order to confine the monopoly within suitable limits, the Act contains provisions 
calculated to prevent the obtaining of collateral advantages. 
Interestingly Murphy also imports the collateral advantages test, although in respect of the 
Patents Act. Murphy J went on to consider section 112(7)(a) which permits clau es 
restricting the sale of goods other than those of a particular person. He commented that 
this section "permits a degree of restrictive practice which does not fit with modern 
legislative policies" .6 Nonetheless the section is still law. Murphy J thus held, contrary to 
Stephen J, that the "circumstances out of which the alleged breach occurred was not 
'selling' but 'using' poles".7 Hence section 112(7)(a) could not excuse the conduct 
prohibited by section 112(1)(a): 8 
Clause 7, on the construction contended for by [Arlo] and accepted by the Court of 
Appeal, is a restrictive device, capable of being used, as was sought in this case, to 
inhibit the use by a licensee of another product which competes with the patented 
one. This is the very kind of mischief at which sec. 112 is aimed. 
Wilson J reached the conclusion that clause 7 did not impose an obligation on Transfield 
to use and sell only the Arlo pole, rather that Transfield merely had to use its best efforts 
to promote the pole. Therefore section 112 of the Patents Act was not infringed. Wilson J 
went on to consider the Trade Practices Act. Here he concluded that the clau e on any 
5Transfield, above n I, 42,310. 
6Transfield, above n 1, 42,310. 
1Transfield, above n I, 42,311 (emphasis added). 
8Transfield, above n 1, 42,311 . 
interpretation operated to increase competition rather than to lessen it. He nonetheless 
commented on section 51(3).9 
[T]hat section provides that sec. 45 shall not be taken to have been contravened by 
reason of a condition of a licence granted by the owner of a patent to the extent 
that the condition relates to articles made by the use of the invention to which the 
patent relates. Clause 7 would seem to fall squarely within that provision . 
A majority of the Court held therefore that Clause 7 wa till valid, but that clause 7 did 
not operate to require Transfield to use and sell only the Arlo pole. Transfield illustrates 
some of the difficulties of the law in this area even with a relatively simple fact situation 
such as this. It would be an understatement to say that the law is left in some confusion. 
Note the different findings on whether a best endeavour clause is an exclusive dealing 
contract, whether Transfield was "selling" or "using" the poles, whether the infringement 
test is gaining a collateral advantage, and what in fact does constitute a collateral 
advantage: All this confusion even before issues such as substantially lessening 
competition are addressed! 
For a contemporary commentary on Transfield see D Shavin "Trade Practice " 1980 
Australian Business Law Review 417. 
9Transfield, above n I, 42,313. 
APPENDIX B -The "Spare Parts" Exemption 
In British Leyland v Armstrong Patents 10 the House of Lords addressed the issue of 
copyright in the market for spare parts ("after-markets"). The defendants were component 
manufacturers who copied the exhaust pipe of an Austin motorcar and sold it in 
competition with the manufacturer. The exhaust pipe, not being an innovation, was 
unprotected by patent. The manufacturer sought to restrain the defendant on the grounds 
of breach of copyright. Lord Templeman described the position as follows: 11 
[British Leyland ("BL")] have obtained an injunction which effectively prevents 
Armstrong from manufacturing replacement exhaust pipes for the Marina. If this 
injunction was rightly granted it follows that any motorist who drives a BL car 
must buy his spare parts from BL at the prices fixed by BL or bear the burden of a 
royalty payable to BL for the privilege of buying his spare part from someone else. 
The purchase of a BL car sells his soul to the company store .. . This appeal has 
wide implications because the injunction granted to BL creates or recogni ses a 
monopoly in replacement parts enjoyable not only by BL and by all vehicle 
manufacturers, but also by all manufacturer of mass-produced machinery in 
respect of repairs . 
The Law Lords held that the defendant had indirectly breached the plaintiffs copyright in 
the drawn plans by reverse engineering the exhaust pipe. The plaintiffs copyright was 
however subject to the right of the purchaser of a car (or any subsequent owner) to keep 
the car in good repair and working order. Furthermore " [ w ]hat the owner needs , if hi 
right of repair is to be of value to him, is the freedom to acquire a previously manufactured 
replacement exhaust system in an unrestricted market" .12 Therefore the defendant had a 
valid defence to copyright infringement. The Law Lords ostensibly based the judgment on 
the doctrine that a grantor (ie British Leyland) may not derogate from the grant, but the 
IOBritish Leyland v Armstrong Patents [1986] I All ER 850. 
I I British Leyland, above n l 0, 864. 
12British Leyland, above n JO, 861 , per Lord Bridge. 
speeches repeatedly refer to the absurd consequences of some aspects of industrial 
copyright. 13 
Copyright protection for functional designs, as extended to articles of functional utility 
manufactured in accordance with those designs, would certainly seem to be capable of 
abuse as a means of obtaining many of the advantages conferred by the patent monopoly 
while circumventing the many stringent conditions and safeguards to which patent 
protection is subject. 
Necessarily the speeches also refer to monopoly: 14 
[I]t seems to me within the capacity of the common law to adapt to changing social and 
economic conditions to counter the belated emergence of the manufacturer's attempts to 
monopolise the spare parts market in reliance on copyright in technical drawings by 
invoking the necessity to safeguard the position of the owner. 
Implicit in this quotation is recognition that the car owner's interests are in competitively 
priced consumer goods, as there was never an issue of availability: Allocative efficiency in 
markets ought not to be disrupted unless necessary to encourage innovative activity. 
However the approach of the House of Lords may not be the best means of dealing with 
the interface. A compulsory license may have been preferable for otherwise the rights 
holder is precluded from gaining monopoly rents on the innovation itself. If the Law Lords 
believed that copyright protection for exhaust pipes is too expansive they may have been 
better to hold that an exhaust pipe, the shape of which is determined purely by functional 
considerations and contains no capricious design elements, may have exhibited in ufficient 
originality to warrant protection in the first place. Once it is accepted that copyright 
subsists however, the courts should not remove the protection that the legislature deems 
necessary to encourage innovation. 
13British Leyland, above n JO, 859, per Lord Bridge. 
14British Leyland, above n 10, 862, per Lord Bridge. 
The spare parts exception has been argued in two New Zealand cases, but was not upheld. 
In Mono Pumps v Karinya Industries Amalgamated proposed to import spare parts (made 
without license in India) for Mono pumps. 15 The pumps were originally protected by 
patent but the patent term of protection had expired. 16 Mono therefore claimed that the 
spare parts for its pumps were protected by copyright and succeeded in gaining an 
interlocutory injunction preventing Amalgamated from importing the spare parts. 
Subsequently the House of Lords delivered its judgment in British Leyland and 
Amalgamated moved for a new order overturning the injunction. Prior to 1985 the 
functional copyright law of England and New Zealand was substantially the same. 17 
Tompkins J declined to follow British Leyland however stating that the 1985 amendments 
to the Copyright Act 1962 addressed this issue. The New Zealand Parliament had 
expressly recognised copyright in three dimensional works industrially applied (ie 
functional goods) and had dealt with the problems of functional copyright by limiting the 
period of protection to 16 years .18 
In Dennison Manufacturing v Alfred Holt the plaintiffs had designed a labelling gun for 
attaching price tags to clothes. 19 The defendants sought to manufacture and supply the 
tags which the plaintiff claimed were protected by copyright. The Court held that the spare 
parts exception was not applicable. 
The spare parts exemption seeks to address the excess of market power conferred on the 
holders of functional copyrights. While judicial attempts to mitigate this power by limiting 
l5Mono Pumps (New Zealand) Ltd v Karinya Industries Ltd 7 IPR 25 . 
16The pumps operated on the principle of the Archimedian screw which has been in use for pumping 
water for centuries. Presumably Mono had found a new application or means of manufacture in order to 
gain patent protection. 
l7Mono Pumps, above n 15, 31. 
1 Ssection 20B( 1) of the Copyright Act 1962. 
l9Dennison Manufacturing Co & Another v Alfred Holt Co Ltd & Others (Unrep. Hight Court, Auckland 
Registry, 5 March 1987, A 736/78, Smellie J). 
the scope of the intellectual property right appear to have failed, there may an alternative 
means. The European courts have considered this issue in the context of refusals to 
license. An order to license to a competitor permits the competitor to compete in the 
manufacture of the goods, and at the same time permits the licensor to gain the benefits of 
the "innovation" through license fees. This solution is less favourable to the competitor, 
who, under the decision in British Leyland, does not have to pay royalties. The British 
Leyland approach seems unsustainable however as Parliament's clear intention, whether a 
good intention or not, was to confer copyright protection on mundane functional goods. 
Resolving the issue in a "refusal to license" context at least encourages efficiency in the 
market of manufacture of the intellectual property goods and prevents the long term 
effects of monopolisation of secondary markets. 
t ~ \.At , ,nr 
YIC.TORJA UiJIVcr1...;ll 1 ._ 
APPENDIX C - Table 4-4 from F J Contractor lntematio11al Technology Licensing: 
Compensation, Costs and Negotiation ( 1981) in OECD Comeptition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Rights (OECD, 1987) 13. 
Table 112. 
Restrictions sought in agreements 
Restrictions 
Terrilorial limitation 011 manufaclure 
Limilations on licensee's exporl quanlity 
Limitations on licencee's export price 
Export only through desiBnnted ngont 
Prohibition handling competitor's products 
Materials lo be purchased from licencors or designated 
agenls 
Grantbacks from licensees 
Quality controls on materials 
Quality controls on finished product 
Percentage of 
responding 
licensor firms 
82.4 
14.7 
5.9 
23.5 
23.5 
Ll.8 
70.6 
29 .4 
55.9 
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